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A Case Ill Suited for Judgment:
Constructing ‘A Sovereign Access to the
Sea’ in the Atacama Desert
Christopher R. Rossi*
In 2015, the International Court of Justice ruled that Bolivia’s claim against Chile could proceed to the merit stage,
setting up this Article’s discussion of perhaps the most intractable border dispute in South American history – Bolivia’s attempt to reclaim from Chile a ‘sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean’. This Article investigates the international law and deeply commingled regional history pertaining to the Atacama Desert region, the hyperarid yet resource-rich region through which Bolivia seeks to secure its
long-lost access to the sea. Investigating the factual circumstances (effectivités), the post-colonial international legal
principle of uti possidetis, territorial temptations arising
from resource discoveries, and the duty to negotiate based
on a pactum de contrahendo, a pactum de negotiando, or
unilateral declarations, this Article concludes this case is
less suited for adjudicative settlement than resolution by the
principal three parties involved in the region – Bolivia,
Chile, and Peru – primarily because the parties have, over
the course of this protracted dispute, constructed intersubjective modalities for a shared sovereignty arrangement fa-
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cilitated by sub-regional economic growth relations. A regional reconstruction of sovereignty in the northern Atacama region presents the better prospect for resolution than
is possible through the limited outcomes presented by formal
third party dispute settlement.
Key words: pactum de contrahendo, pactum de negotiando, condominium, sovereignty, War of the Pacific, constructivism
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I.
INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 2013, Bolivia instituted proceedings against Chile
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning Chile’s
obligation to negotiate an agreement granting landlocked Bolivia
full sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.1 The claim highlights the
legal status of the Atacama Desert,2 one of the world’s driest and
most forbidding places.3
The Atacama Desert once served as Bolivia’s sovereign corridor
to the ocean.4 It also once prompted a major international conflict
in nineteenth century South America, the War of the Pacific, which

1
Application Instituting Proceedings on the Obligation to Negotiate Access
to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), 2013 I.C.J. No. 153, ¶ 1 at 10 (Apr. 24,
2013), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/17338.pdf [hereinafter Application
to Negotiate Access]; Bolivia Institutes Proceedings Against Chile with Regard
to a Dispute Concerning the Obligation of Chile to Negotiate the “Sovereign Access of Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean,” I.C.J. (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.icj-cij.o
rg/docket/files/153/17340.pdf (unofficial press release).
2
See generally Application to Negotiate Access, supra note 1. The northern
tier of the Atacama Desert is near the border of Chile and Peru, stretching nearly
1000km (600 miles) south, covering a landmass about the size of New York State
(140,000km squared or 54,000 square miles). Randy Russell, Atacama Desert,
WINDOWS TO THE UNIVERSE, http://www.windows2universe.org/earth/atacama
_desert.html (last modified Oct. 27, 2008). The region generally is described as
consisting of the territorial stretch along the Pacific coast of South America from
about latitude 19 ° South to 25° South. See also BRUCE W. FARCAU, THE TEN
CENTS WAR: CHILE, PERU, AND BOLIVIA IN THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, 1879-1884,
5 (2000) [hereinafter FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR].
3
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 5 (describing its terrain
as “some of the least hospitable on earth”); Tibor J. Dunai, Gabriel A. González
López & Joaquim Juez-Larré, Oligocene-Miocene Age of Aridity in the Atacama
Desert Revealed by Exposing Dating of Erosion-sensitive Landforms, 33
GEOLOGY 321, 321-24 (2015) (noting the Atacama Desert’s status as a major hyperarid desert “represents an extreme habitat for life on Earth and serves as an
analogue for dry conditions on Mars”); Deserts of the World, THE 7 CONTINENTS
OF THE WORLD, http://www.whatarethe7continents.com/deserts-of-the-world/#at
acamadesert (last visited Sept. 2, 2016) (attributing hyperaridity of the Atacama
Desert (receiving 0.04 inches (1mm) of water per year) to its situation between
the moisture blocking Andes and Chilean Coastal mountain ranges); South America: Chile, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ci.html (last modified Aug. 25, 2016) (describing it as the
driest desert in the world).
4
Application to Negotiate Access, supra note 1, at 12, ¶ 9.
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cost Bolivia sovereignty over its coastline.5 On September 24, 2015,
the ICJ dismissed Chile’s preliminary objection to the Court’s jurisdiction,6 ruling a 1904 Peace Treaty,7 following an armistice of
1884,8 did not bar proceeding to the merits.9
This Article assesses the prospect for a shared sovereignty or
coparcener solution to the dispute in light of this case. When two or
more states exercise joint sovereignty over territory, these types of
arrangements – also called condominium arrangements – are established.10 They require a mutuality of interest and shared decisionmaking, a kind of ownership that allows for divisible sovereignty,

5
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 11; see also WILLIAM
F. SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC 2 (1986) (noting the War of the
Pacific “constituted one of the more significant military and naval encounters of
the late nineteenth century”).
6
See Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile),
Preliminary Objection, Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. No. 153, 20, ¶ 54 (Sept. 24),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18746.pdf [hereinafter Obligation to Negotiate Access, Preliminary Objection].
7
Treaty of Peace and Amity between Bolivia and Chile (the 1904 Peace
Treaty) art. I, Bol.-Chile, Oct. 20, 1904, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/1
8616.pdf (translated in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection of the Republic of Chile, 2014 I.C.J., Annex
10 (July 15)) [hereinafter 1904 Peace Treaty].
8
Truce Pact between Bolivia and Chile (the 1884 Truce Pact), Bol-Chile,
Apr. 4, 1884, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18616.pdf (translated in
Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection of the Republic of Chile, 2015 I.C.J., Annex 2 (July 15)) [hereinafter 1884 Truce Pact]. Peru, a co-belligerent and ally of Bolivia, signed a peace
treaty (as opposed to an armistice) with Chile the year before. See Treaty of Peace
of Ancón, Chile -Peru, Oct. 20 1883, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18
616.pdf (reprinted in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia
v. Chile), Preliminary Objection of the Republic of Chile, 2014 I.C.J., Annex 1
(July 15) [hereinafter Treaty of Ancón]. Bolivia and Chile replaced the armistice
– the 1884 Truce Pact – and formally ended the war by concluding the 1904 Peace
Treaty, although Bolivia later denounced it. 1904 Peace Treaty, supra note 7, at
art. I.
9
See Obligation to Negotiate Access, Preliminary Objection, supra note 6,
at 19, ¶ 50 (“In the Court’s view, . . . the matters in dispute are matters [not] settled
by . . . treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of [the Pact of Bogotá, which
established the Court’s jurisdiction]”).
10
1 L. OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 171 (1) (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
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but not without pre-determined respect for ground rules of co-ownership.11 Chile and Bolivia once fruitlessly attempted a condominium arrangement in the Atacama;12 and Chile also proffered territorial exchanges to allow Bolivia sovereign access to the sea.13 Both
prospects may resurface in judicial considerations, should the ICJ
render a judgment on the merits, but the Court’s consideration of the
latter prospect is less likely to affect its judgment. Chile proffered
Peru’s territory,14 then territory captured from Peru,15 making
Chile’s donative intent unlike O. Henry’s parable of mutual sacrifice, The Gift of the Magi.16 Chile’s donative intent has never factored into the equation for a condominium solution in the Atacama;17 and Bolivia’s internal misrule compounded by the abject re-

11

See generally Joel H. Samuels, Condominium Arrangements in International Practice: Reviving an Abandoned Concept of Boundary Dispute Resolution, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 727 (2008).
12
RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS: POWER
POLITICS IN THE ATACAMA DESERT 7 (Program in Latin American Studies Occasional Paper Series No. 28 1992) [hereinafter ST JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND
SEAPORTS].
13
Id. at 8.
14
See generally infra text accompanying note, 17, 211-13.
15
According to historian, Bruce Farcau:
“Successive governments in La Paz have consistently demanded access to the
sea, and the Chileans have offered a corridor along the current Chile-Peru
border that would answer that demand as well as provide a buffer against a
still-hostile and well-armed Peru. However, the Peruvians insist that the land
involved in such a deal would have been formerly Peruvian territory and that,
if Chile wants to give it to anyone, it should return it to Peru, implying that
Bolivia will remain landlocked unless Chile chooses to return all the land it
took from Peru first, which seems unlikely.”
BRUCE FARCAU, War of the Pacific (1879-1883), in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WAR at 1628 (Gordon Martel ed. 2012). The strip of territory proffered by Chile
in exchange is the eighteen kilometer band of the Lluta Valley, situated between
the Arica-La Paz railway and the border of Chile and Peru.
16
See O. HENRY, THE GIFT OF THE MAGI (with illustrations by Lisbeth Swerger, Picture Book Studio, 1982) (involving Della’s sale of her brown cascade of
hair to purchase for Jim a platinum fob chain; and Jim’s sale of his heirloom gold
watch for a bejeweled set of tortoise shell combs for Della).
17
As an example, Chile proposed a Bolivian corridor north of Arica (involving territory formerly belonging to Peru and possibly including the sale of the
Arica-La Paz railway) but offset by territorial compensation from Bolivia
“roughly equivalent to the area ceded.” Dennis R. Gordon, The Question of the
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alities of its geo-strategic checkmate have complicated its own attempts to negotiate a solution with either Chile or Peru. Bolivia long
ago recognized that Chile held the padlock and Peru held the key to
Bolivia’s post-War of the Pacific quest to regain a blue water port.18
Nevertheless, Bolivia has revisited bilateral attempts to pick the
lock. In 1910, Peru parried an informal Bolivian query about both
Peru and Chile renouncing interests in the Tacna and Arica provinces in favor of granting Bolivia a corridor to the sea.19 Secret talks
between Bolivia and Chile, which combined the coastal access issue
with a contentious riparian dispute over a proposed diversion of water from the Lauca River,20 collapsed in 1971 when Bolivia’s government was overthrown.21 A mid-1970s Brazilian proposal to grant
Bolivia a corridor to the sea through Arica failed because Peruvian
popular opinion opposed ceding to Bolivia territory ‘rightfully’ belonging to Peru.22 Linking Chilean territorial concessions to a Bolivian offer of liquefied natural gas backfired and contributed to 60
deaths and the demise of Bolivian President Carlos Mesa’s regime
in 2005.23 Chile and Bolivia picked up discussions again in 2006 as

Pacific: Current Perspectives on a Long-Standing Dispute, 141 WORLD AFFAIRS
INST. 321, 325 (1979).
18
See id. at 324 (quoting Bolivian General Carlos Alcoreza Milgarejo).
19
See ST JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 22.
20
Arica’s status as a possible bargaining chip was complicated during the
1960s by control over the waters of the Lauca River, a 140-mile long river originating in the Chilean Andes feeding into Bolivia’s Lake Coipasa. Lake Coipasa
served as a water source for towns on the Bolivian Altiplano, igniting a dispute
when Chile diverted water to irrigate valleys feeding Arica. See Robert D. Tomasek, The Chilean-Bolivian Lauca River Dispute and the O.A.S., 9 J. OF INTERAM. STUD. 351-66 (1967). It has been suggested that Chile’s interest in contemplating a trade-off solution (i.e., exchanging formerly Peruvian territory north of
Arica for a Bolivian concession of roughly equal territory) was “specifically
aimed at securing exclusive and unassailable access to the Rio Lauca.” Gordon,
supra note 17, at 328. The riparian dispute caused a rupture in diplomatic relations
in 1962. Id. at 324.
21
See ST. JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 27.
22
Id.
23
See Leslie Wehner, From Rivalry to Mutual Trust: The Othering Process
between Bolivia and Chile, 135 GERMAN INSTITUTE OF GLOBAL & AREA STUDIES
1, 6 (May 2010), http://giga.hamburg/en/system/files/publications/wp135_wehne
r.pdf (working paper) (discussing the failure of the gas por mar initiative).
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part of a now-stalled ‘13-point’ agenda to improve bilateral relations.24 Chile’s former President Sebastian Piñera scuttled a plan in
2010 to establish a non-sovereign coastal enclave for Bolivia in
Chile’s northern region of Tarapacá, contending that migratory, free
transit, and administrative and infrastructure privileges would functionally divide Chilean territory in two.25 In response, Bolivian
President Evo Morales, and his Peruvian counterpart, Alan Garcia
Pérez, signed a deal granting Bolivia a 99-year extension to a freetrade zone concession on a three-mile stretch of shoreline near
Peru’s southern port of Ilo — a gesture of symbolic rather than economic significance.26 Discussions about changing the territorial
status of the northern tier of the Atacama Desert involve historical
claims of the three Andean states, making bilateral solutions difficult because they upset a tenuous balance of power and sow seeds
of suspicion. Any solution farther south involving the Atacama’s
midsection would cleave Chile in two – a partition it vows will not
occur.27
24
Agenda point six contains the Bolivian maritime claim to establish a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The 13-point agenda includes: (1) Mutual Confidence Building Measures; (2) Border Integration; (3) Freedom of Movement;
(4) Physical Integration; (5) Economic Cooperation; (6) Access to the Sea; (7) the
Silala River issue and Water Resources; (8) Poverty Alleviation; (9) Security and
Defense; (10) Cooperation against Drug Trafficking; (11) Education, Science, and
Technology improvements; (12) Culture; and (13) Energy Issues. Id. at 7 n.2.
25
See Chile Outlines Conditions for a Possible Bolivian Access to the Pacific,
MERCOPRESS (Dec. 7, 2010), http://en.mercopress.com/2010/12/07/chile-outline
s-conditions-for-a-possible-bolivian-access-to-the-pacific [hereinafter Chile Outlines Conditions] (The foundation for the accord (known as Boliviamar) dated to
bilateral discussions commencing in 1992); Tess Bennett, Bolivia’s Long Diplomatic Road to the Coast, THE ARGENTINA INDEPENDENT (Sept. 25, 2013), http://
www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/bolivias-long-diplomatic-road-tothe-coast/.
26
Who Will Gain as Bolivia Wins Support in an Age-old Border Dispute?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 12, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu
/article/who-will-gain-as-bolivia-wins-support-in-an-age-old-border-dispute/
(The economic significance of the agreement has been questioned because the
port at Ilo is too far north and lacking in trade links that can accommodate Bolivian commercial needs. Bolivia has had access to the free trade zone at Ilo since
1992 but has done little if anything to develop it).
27
Chile Outlines Conditions, supra note 25 (citing Chilean Foreign Minister
Alfredo Moreno’s pledge never to divide the country in two over Bolivia’s sea
access quest).
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A condominium arrangement, therefore, has some appeal. An
examination of this idea within this context enhances perspectives
on shared sovereignty solutions generally, recalls specific problems
involving the doctrine of the pactum de contrahendo (an agreement
to negotiate a future agreement)28 – specifically problems of proof
and enforceability– reinforces the limited value of factual circumstances (effectivités) used to untangle competing historical narratives, and provides an important prospect for a solution other than
the problematic status quo and historically still-born efforts to arrive
at a bilateral solution within a trilateral context.
International law’s track record on shared sovereignty arrangements is not good.29 Such solutions are thought practical only where
a cooperative spirit prevails, in which case simpler solutions might
better be pursued.30 Condominium arrangements in international

28
See ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 27, 29 (2nd ed.,
1961) (applying the concept to the good faith obligation to negotiate “in the future
with a view to the conclusion of a treaty” but differentiating it from a duty to
conclude a treaty); see generally Ulrich Beyerlin, Pactum de Contrahendo und
Pactum de Negotiando im Völkerrecht? 36 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [ZaöRV ] 442-43 (1976) [hereinafter
Beyerlin, Pactum de Contrahendo und Pactum de Negotiando im Völkerrecht?];
Ulrich Beyerlin, Pactum de Contrahendo, Pactum de Negotiando, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 854-58 (Rudolf Berhardt ed.,
1984); Martin A. Rogoff, The Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules
and Realities, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141, 170-71 (1994).
29
See Christopher R. Rossi, Jura Novit Curia? Condominium in the Gulf of
Fonseca and the “Local Illusion” of a Pluri-State Bay, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 793,
798-800 (2015) (noting historical problems with condominium arrangements).
30
1 INTERNATIONAL LAW BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT 370 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed. 1970).
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law are not common,31 nor compelling,32 but they are not inconceivable.33 Such a solution in the Atacama Desert dispute seems pragmatic, even workable, although history reveals a cautionary tale:
truculent relations characterize Bolivian-Chilean and indeed regional relations.34 They date to Chile’s successful campaign to disrupt the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation in the 1830s.35 The two
countries have maintained only consular relations since the failure
of the Charaña negotiations of 1978,36 and have had no formal diplomatic relations since the early 1960s except between 1975-1978.37
Contested political alignments, shifting allegiances, corrupt governance, and secret agreements overlay a historical map of disputed and
31
See The Republic of El Salvador v. The Republic of Nicaragua, 11 AM.
SOCIETY OF INT’L L. 674, 712 (1917) (noting condominium arrangements are not
common in the relations among nations) [hereinafter El Salvador v. Nicaragua].
32
See Peter Schneider, Condominium, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 732, 734 (Rudolf L. Bernhardt ed., 1992) (referring to condominium arrangements as an “historical relic from the feudal age); 6 J.H.W.
VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69 (1973) (referring
to condominium as “peculiar and exceptional”); Samuels, supra note 11, at 72830 (noting problems with the concept as a workable concept).
33
El Salvador v. Nicaragua, supra note 31, at 712 (noting condominium arrangements are “not an inconceivable or an isolated fact”). Several historical examples of condominium arrangements include the joint US-UK control over the
Oregon Country from 1815-1846, the provisional arrangement in 1920 concerning the Free City of Danzig, the 1910-13 trilateral conference discussions among
Norway, Sweden and Russia regarding Spitsbergen, and Andorra, which from
1278-1993 was administered jointly by France and the Catalan Bishop of Urgell.
See Rossi, supra note 29, at 799. For a problematic pelagic adaptation of the condominium concept involving three Central American countries, see generally id.
34
See generally Wehner, supra note 23 (discussing Bolivia and Chile’s socially constructed culture of rivalry).
35
See CLEMENTS R. MARKHAM, THE WAR BETWEEN PERU AND CHILE, 18791882, 31-34 (1882) (discussing Chilean endeavors to dissolve the Confederation);
SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 2 (noting Chile’s
triumphant fight against establishment of a Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation during the 1830s).
36
Chile and Bolivia entered into secret negotiations in 1973 following the
rupture in diplomatic relations caused by the Lauca River diversion dispute of
1962. In 1975 Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet and Bolivian President Hugo Banzer met in the Bolivian border town of Charaña, where a forestalled land exchange
was discussed. See infra text accompanying n. 274.
37
See ULDARICIO FIGUEROA, LA DEMANDA MARITIME BOLIVIANA EN LOS
FOROS INTERNACIONALES 117-37 (2007) (discussing the resumption of diplomatic
relations from 1975-78 and the preceding thaw beginning in 1970).
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indeterminate boundaries regarding territory emergent in resources
– gold and silver from the time of Pizarro’s sixteenth century assault
on the Inca Empire;38 fertilizer-rich guano, caliche (sodium nitrate),
saltpeter (potassium nitrate), rubber and copper in the nineteenth
century; tin, gas, and oil in the early twentieth century.39 Control
over these resources has repeatedly complicated this dispute as well
as Andean relations throughout the Southern Cone.40 It has challenged the effectiveness of international law’s blunt doctrine of uti
possidetis (as you possess, so you may possess) and has resulted in
war, annexation, revolution, and territorial dismemberment. As uncompromising as this border dispute seems,41 the least popular solution –for Bolivia to agree to drop its claim and be content with
only reaping the economic benefits of using Chilean ports – appears
the most obvious, and it has some historical support within the hostile environment of the Atacama Desert.42
Woven throughout this complicated history is the recurring
problem of territorial temptation – the desire of capable states to
control emergent resources, or when not possible, then to share the
resources or work to preclude another state’s ability to secure
38

See JOHN HEMMING, THE CONQUEST OF THE INCAS 47-48 (1970); KIM
MACQUARRIE, THE LAST DAYS OF THE INCAS 95-96 (2007) (noting astonishing
accounts of Francisco Pizarro’s third expedition to Peru and his 1532 capture of
the Incan nobleman, Atahualpa and his famous offer of a room full of gold, twice
filled over with silver, if his life were to be spared).
39
Andean countries, Chile and Bolivia particularly, are repositories of the
world’s largest untapped lithium reserves, a mineral essential to operating computers, batteries, cell phones, and portable electronic devices. Hal Hodson, Follow
the Lithium Dreams Expedition to Chile and Bolivia, NEW SCIENTIST (July 22,
2015), https://www.newscientist.com/article/follow-the-lithium-dreams-expedition-to-chile-and-bolivia/.
40
See ARIE M. KOCOWICZ, ZONES OF PEACE IN THE THIRD WORLD: SOUTH
AMERICA AND WEST AFRICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 67 (1998) (Southern
Cone countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador).
41
Indeed, Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution declares an “inalienable and imprescriptible” right over the territory giving access to the Pacific Ocean and its maritime space. “El Estado boliviano declara su derecho irrenunciable e imprescriptible sobre el territorio que le dé acceso al océano Pacífico y su espacio marítimo.”
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO PLURINACIONAL DE BOLIVIA [Constitution] Feb. 7, 2009, art. 267.
42
See Bolivia/Chile Pacific Access, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS
(June 24, 2011), http://www.coha.org/boliviachile-pacific-access/.
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them.43 Territorial temptation and condominium arrangements
seem incompatible, unless they inescapably reflect the rational interests of all parties concerned. A solution that reflects these interests seems more tenable than Bolivia’s demand for a return of territory as a reparation for Chile’s war of aggression,44 and more practical than an appeal to Chile’s sense of international comity or conscience. Perhaps a point of shared interest arises in the northern Atacama Desert and makes the prospect of an accommodation feasible,
notwithstanding the overarching historical record: this case marks
another stage in a longstanding feud, perhaps the most “intractable”
border dispute in the Americas,45 and yet another contentious chapter in the centuries-long complications arising from Spain’s conquest and colonial rule of the Americas.46
In addition to this introduction, this Article will proceed as follows: Part II will detail the parties’ competing perspectives about
their duties to negotiate, as well as the ICJ’s preliminary decision
upholding its jurisdiction. Part III will discuss two principal forms
of negotiation presented by the case, the pactum de contrahendo and
the pactum de negotiando, and distinguish their binding effects from
unilateral declarations. Part IV will review the broad historical and
factual circumstances underpinning the dispute, concentrating on
the colonial history dating to the Spanish rule over the New World,
and the post-colonial territorial disputes that resulted in the War of

43
See Christopher R. Rossi, A Particular Kind of Dominium: The Grotian
Tendency and the Global Commons in a Time of High Arctic Change, 11 J. INT’L
L. & INT’L REL 1, 26 (2015) (discussing territorial temptation).
44
See CARLOS D. MESA GISBERT, PRESIDENCIA SITIADA: MEMORIAS DE MI
GOBIERNO 243 (2008).
45
WALTRAUD Q. MORALES, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BOLIVIA 78 (2d ed., 2003).
In June 2016, Chile instituted another proceeding against Bolivia before the ICJ
concerning the status and use of waters of the Silala (the Bolivian name)/Siloli
(the Chilean name), a disputed international watercourse fed by groundwater
springs in Bolivia and flowing into Chilean territory. Chile Institutes Proceedings
Against Bolivia with Regard to a Dispute Concerning the Status and Use of the
Waters of the Silala, I.C.J. (June 6, 2016), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/162
/19018.pdf (unofficial press release).
46
Latin America is the most represented continent in contentious cases before
the I.C.J., with eight of thirty suits initiated between 2000 and 2013. Laetitia Rouvière & Latetitia Perrier Bruslé, Bolivia-Chile-Peru: Sea Access, in 1 BORDER
DISPUTES: A GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 53 (Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015).
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the Pacific and its shattering aftermath. Part V will review the accumulative evidence following that war to shed light on the legal
basis involving the parties’ duty to negotiate. Part VI will discuss
the prospects for establishing a zone of tripartite sovereigns in the
northern Atacama, and draw conclusions about the constructed modalities that could produce a fruitful resolution to the dispute, mindful however of the territorial temptations that have made this border
issue a vexing problem throughout South America.
A DUTY TO NEGOTIATE WHAT? JUDGE OWADA’S QUESTION
The ICJ’s ruling on the preliminary question suggested the subject matter of this dispute may revolve around a question other than
that of a condominium arrangement.47 The ruling focused on a duty
to negotiate rather than to grant, much less share, sovereignty.48
This duty arises to resolve a “mutual problem [of] common interest,” presumably where a state’s legal right intersects with another
state’s right.49 But this duty begs an important question in this case:
what must the parties negotiate? The question is more subtle than
appearances indicate, prompting Judge Hisashi Owada to ask during
oral hearings what did the parties mean by their repeated references
to a “sovereign access to the sea[?]”50
II.

A.

Chile’s View
Chile contended the access it agreed to provide to Bolivia in the
1904 Peace Treaty pertained in perpetuity to the “fullest and most
unrestricted right of commercial transit in its territory and its Pacific
47

See Obligation to Negotiate Access, Preliminary Objection, supra note 6,
at 12-15, ¶¶ 25-36.
48
Id, at 14, ¶ 34.
49
Rogoff, supra note 28, at 148. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, the ICJ
noted the intersection of Iceland’s “preferential fishing rights” and Great Britain’s
“traditional fishing rights” in a common maritime area, holding a state assumes
its own obligation to take account of the rights of other States’ in such circumstances. See e.g. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. Ice.), Merits, Judgment, 1974
I.C.J. No. 55, 31, ¶ 71 (July 25).
50
Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile),
Preliminary Objection, Public Sitting, 2015 C.R. 21, 38-39 (May 8), http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18648.pdf (Judge Owada’s question) [hereinafter May
8 Public Sitting].
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ports” and that the access “Bolivia has a right to is not sovereign
access.”51 Chile contended Bolivia aimed to force a negotiation on
the transfer of “coastal territory bathed by the Pacific Ocean.”52 It
claimed the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to consider this issue because the
1904 Peace Treaty “already settled” that matter.53 In Chile’s view,
Bolivia’s plea ‘artificially’ reframed the fact of Chile’s territorial
sovereignty and the question of Bolivia’s ‘right of access’ to the sea
into a negotiation only about the details of Bolivia’s sovereign access – that is, how much territory was involved and its location – as
if these factors already had not been settled by war and peace.54 Bolivia’s posturing, according to Chile, attempted to secure a judicially
predetermined outcome to revise or nullify the 1904 Peace Treaty.55
Chile argued that re-litigating its history would potentially unravel
and destabilize the continent’s borders.56 At most, Chile acknowledged a duty to negotiate access, which neither implied a duty to
reach an agreement nor to grant sovereignty.

51
Letter from Felipe Bulnes, Agent of Chile, to Registrar of the Court, Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Chile’s Answer
to Judge Owada’s question concerning the meaning of “sovereign access to the
sea” (May 12, 2015) http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18662.pdf (citing art.
VI of the 1904 Peace Treaty, in which Chile recognizes “in favour of Bolivia in
perpetuity the fullest and most unrestricted right of commercial transit in its territory and its Pacific ports”).
52
Id.
53
Specifically, Chile claimed pursuant to art. VI of the Pact of Bogotá (1948),
to which both parties belonged, that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction under art. XXXI
of the Pact (the article establishing compulsory jurisdiction) because the matter
was “already settled” and in force at the conclusion of the Pact. See Obligation to
Negotiate Access, Preliminary Objection, supra note 6, at 10-11 ¶¶ 21-22.
54
Id. at 13, ¶¶ 28- 29.
55
Id. Underscoring its sense of moral outrage, Bolivia has referenced the Realpolitik conclusion of Abraham König, Chile’s Minister Plenipotentiary to La
Paz, as evidence of Chile’s denial of previous commitments to negotiate. In a note
dated August 13, 1900, König likened Chile’s takeover of the Atacama to Germany’s imperial annexation of Alsace and Lorraine: “Nuestros derechos nacen de
la victoria, la ley suprema de las naciones. Que el Litoral es rico y vale muchos
millones, eso ya lo sabíamos.” EL LIBRO DEL MAR 32 (Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores de Bolivia 2nd ed. 2014).
56
See Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile)
Preliminary Objection, Public Sitting, 2015 C.R. 20, 41, ¶ 10 (May 7) (verbatim
record of Mr. Koh) [hereinafter May 7 Public Sitting].
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B.

Bolivia’s View
Bolivia claimed the case was not about the precise ‘modalities’
for granting a sovereign access to the sea, although elsewhere asserted a non-negotiable end result: “Chile must grant Bolivia its own
access to the sea with sovereignty.”57 Bolivia claimed “the specific
modalities of sovereign access are not matters for the Court but, rather, are matters for future agreement” between the parties and that
the dispute had nothing to do with the 1904 Peace Treaty because
“the alleged obligation to negotiate existed independently of and in
parallel to, the 1904 Peace Treaty.”58 Bolivia’s sovereign entitlement derived “from Chile’s own unilateral declarations or its repeated agreements with Bolivia to negotiate sovereign access[;]”59
from Chile’s declarations preceding and subsequently confirming a
1950 Exchange of Notes;60 from “agreements, diplomatic practice
and . . . declarations attributable to [Chile]” extending more than a

57

See Bolivia’s Response to the Question of Judge Owada, ICJ, http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18660.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
58
Obligation to Negotiate Access, Preliminary Objection, supra note 6, at 13,
¶ 30.
59
See Bolivia’s Comments on Chile’s Reply to Judge Owada’s Questions ¶
3, ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18664.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2016).
60
See id. at ¶¶ 3-6. (explaining that Bolivia contends a 1950 Note of the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 20, 1950 expressly recognized prior
agreements aimed at “finding a formula” that will make it possible to give to Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean of its own. The Note recognized: “the
1895 Transfer Treaty, the 1920 Act [between Bolivian and Chilean foreign ministries, which considered Bolivian sovereign access to the sea through Arica],
Chile’s Note of 1923, the 1926 Kellogg proposal and Matte Memorandum [a U.S.
proposal favorable to Bolivia],” declarations of the Chilean President between
1946 and 1949, Chile’s Memorandum of July 10, 1961 [repeating and subsequently confirming the 1950 Exchange of Notes], and various resolutions of the
Organization of American States (O.A.S.) unanimously calling for “a formula for
giving Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, on bases that take into
account mutual conveniences, rights and interests of all parties involved”).
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century,61 reaching to Chile’s highest-level representatives,62 and
existing independently from the 1904 Peace Treaty,63 and ultimately
breached by Chile when it denied its obligation to negotiate in 2011
and 2012.64 Bolivia argued the teleological implications of the obligation to negotiate required an agreement, the precise form to be
determined by future negotiations.65
C.

The ICJ’s View
The ICJ agreed with Bolivia, holding that previous agreements
did not bar the Court from proceeding, although it held certain
claims in abeyance.66 It ruled the case at this juncture was not about
affirming Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea, nor about pronouncing the legal status of the 1904 Peace Treaty;67 these contentions,
assuming arguendo the ICJ were to find them valid, are subjects of
future consideration.68 The subject-matter of the dispute “is whether
Chile is obligated to negotiate in good faith Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean and, if such an obligation exists, whether
Chile has breached it[?]”69 This issue pertains to the duty to negotiate sovereignty, not determine sovereignty. Similar to its limited
charge in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the drawing of a

61

Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile): The
Court Rejects the Preliminary Objection Raised by Chile and Finds That it has
Jurisdiction to Entertain the Application filed by Bolivia on 24 April 2013, I.C.J.
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18756.pdf (unofficial
press release) (quoting Bolivian memorial).
62
Obligation to Negotiate Access, Preliminary Objection, supra note 6, at
13-14, ¶ 31.
63
Id. at 14, ¶ 31.
64
Id.
65
See May 8 Public Sitting, supra note 50, at 32, ¶ 7 (“What matters is that
it would be an agreed solution, and not an imposed solution.”) (Mr. Akhayan).
66
See Obligation to Negotiate access, Preliminary Objection, supra note 6,
at 19 ¶ 50.
67
Id. at 14, ¶ 33 (“[T]he Court recalls that Bolivia does not ask the Court to
declare that it has a right to sovereign access to the sea or to pronounce on the
legal status of the 1904 Peace Treaty”).
68
See id. (“it would not be for the Court to predetermine the outcome of any
negotiation”).
69
Id. at 14, ¶ 34.
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new border appears to be overtaken by the ICJ’s explication of principles the parties must themselves apply.70 As that matter has not
been “already settled” pursuant to the jurisdictional requirement of
Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá,71 the case proceeds.72
III.
DISTINCTIONS WITH DIFFERENCES: THE DUTY TO
NEGOTIATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DUTY TO SHARE SOVEREIGNTY
Judge Owada’s query about the meaning of ‘a sovereign access
to the sea’ raised subtle issues about a duty to negotiate, a subject he
is thoroughly familiar with as an academic and diplomat.73 His
question followed Bolivia’s oral argument about “obligations arising from” pacta de contrahendo, negocio [negotiando] and estoppel,74 elsewhere reformulated in terms of “unilateral declarations.”75
A.
Pacta de Contrahendo and Negotiando and Unilateral
Declarations
A pactum de contrahendo obligates parties to conclude a future
agreement; a pactum de negotiando, equally binding although less
70

North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment,
1969 I.C.J. Nos. 51 & 52, at 6 (Feb. 20) (By Special Agreement, parties in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases limited the Court to decide “[w]hat principles
and rules of international law are applicable to the delimitation as between the
Parties.”).
71
See Obligation to Negotiate Access, Preliminary Objection, supra note 6,
at 15-20, ¶¶ 37-54.
72
Id. at 20, ¶ 54.
73
See HISASHI OWADA, STUDY ON TREATY RESERVATIONS AND
DECLARATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, UN AND JAPAN. TOKYO FESTSCHRIFT
TAKANO 361-384 (1988). Owada served as Japan’s permanent representative to
the United Nations and as the director-general of the Treaties Bureau (principal
legal advisor) for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and taught at Tokyo University,
Harvard, Columbia, and New York University. See Who We Are: Hisashi Owada
(Japan), UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATIONS, http://www.unfoundation.org/whowe-are/board/hisashi-owada-japan.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/ (last
visited Aug. 26, 2016).
74
See May 8 Public Sitting, supra note 50, at 32, ¶ 6 (verbatim record of Mr.
Akhayan).
75
Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile),
Preliminary Objection, Public sitting, 2015 C.R. 19, 52 ¶ 6 (May 6) (verbatim
record of Mr. Akhavan) [hereinafter May 6 Public Sitting].
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demanding in substance, obligates parties to enter into future negotiations, but does not “[bind] the parties to arrive at an agreement.”76
Unilateral statements made by authorized officials have legal effect
and can work as an estoppel.77 They have been held binding against
the interests of the declarant state in territorial disputes,78 questions
of jurisdiction,79 and in general statements opposable to the world
(erga omnes).80
While pacta de contrahendo and negotiando share legal characteristics, in treaty and general international law, and at times are
“nearly imperceptible” in terms of difference, they express different

76

See Hisashi Owada, Pactum de Contrahendo, Pactum de Negotiando, in
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-6 (2008). See
also Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 564, 566-68 (1993) (distinguishing pacta de contrahendo from the
“more tenuous” pacta de negotiando). In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
the ICJ (citing P.C.I.J.’s Advisory Opinion in the case of Railway Traffic between
Lithuania and Poland) recognized “the obligation [to negotiate] was ‘not only to
enter into negotiations but also to pursue them as far as possible with a view to
concluding agreements’, even if an obligation to negotiate did not imply an obligation to reach agreement.” North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 70, at 47-48
¶87.
77
See generally D.W. Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and
its Relation to Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 176 (1957); W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Question of Unilateral Governmental Statements as Applicable Law in Investment Disputes, 19 ICSID REVIEW 328, 339-40
(2004) (noting the doctrine of estoppel’s place in discussions of unilateral statements and its requirement of detrimental reliance).
78
See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 36, 57, 71 (Apr. 5) (holding Norway Foreign Minister
Ihlen ‘s pledge that Danish sovereignty over Greenland “would meet with no difficulties on the part of Norway” was binding) [the Ihlen Declaration]; see Arbitral
Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hon. v. Nic.), Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. No. 39, at 210 (Nov. 18) (involving a telegram sent by the President of Nicaragua to the President of Honduras recognizing as a binding acceptance a territorial award made by the King of Spain).
79
Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thai.), Judgment, Preliminary Objections, 1961, I.C.J. No. 45, at 17 (May 26) (involving acceptance of the Court’s
jurisdiction).
80
See Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974, I.C.J. No. 59, 472
¶¶ 44-46 (Dec. 20) (noting France’s unilateral declaration to cease atmospheric
nuclear tests was binding against France, although issued as a general statement).
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understandings of parties’ intent to be bound.81 Judge Charles De
Visscher found them almost indistinguishable when the object of
negotiations “is only to apply in practice principles forming part of
a pre-established” agreement.82 Even so, an obligation to negotiate
does not mean an obligation to agree.83 The parties’ intent also distinguishes the pacta from nonbinding agreements84 and other forms
of dispute settlement, such as conciliation and mediation.85 Importantly, both principles impose obligations that cannot be changed
by the will of one party (non si voluero), and both are distinguished
from unaccepted offers, aspirations, guidelines, or so-called pollicitations (punctationes), which are not enforceable.86 They have
arisen in the interpretation of important and familiar treaties, including the Camp David Accords,87 the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),88 the Non-Proliferation Treaty

81

Owada, supra note 76, at ¶ 29-30; McNair supra note 28, at 29 (referencing
pactum de contrahendo’s misleading association with the obligation to negotiate
in good faith).
82
International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J.
No. 10,186, 188 (Judge De Visscher dissenting).
83
Stephen L. Kass, Obligatory Negotiations in International Organizations,
1965 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 36, 38 (1965).
84
Beyerlin, Pactum de Contrahendo und Pactum de Negotiando im Völkerrecht?, supra note 28, at 412 (“Der rechtliche Bindungswille der Parteien liefert
somit das maßgebliche Kriterium für die Abgrenzung zwischen einem pactum
und einer rechtlich unverbindlichen Abrede”).
85
Rogoff, supra note 28, at 148 (distinguishing the obligation to negotiate
from other forms of dispute settlement such as conciliation, mediation, inquiry,
arbitration, and more).
86
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 660-61 (Ronald F.
Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1920).
87
Owada, supra note 76, at ¶ 19.
88
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 283,1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (Dec. 10, 1982) (requiring that disputes “proceed expeditiously to
an exchange of views regarding [their] settlement by negotiation or other peaceful
means”).
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(NPT),89 the 1993 ‘Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements’ signed by Israel and the PLO,90 and in numerous non-binding instruments.91
B.
Problems with Pacta Contrahendo and Negotiando:
Articulating and Enforcing an Operational Standard
As weighty as these above references appear, pacta de contrahendo and negotiando are sometimes employed by hostile parties to
avoid any claim of “premature substantive agreement,”92 or to postpone agreement over substantive content.93 They establish the lowest common denominator of agreed upon procedures on which future discussions can build,94 and at times provide much needed
breathing space for “states to order their conduct on the basis of general agreements while adjusting details” as developing circumstances dictate.95 Case law suggests that if a pactum de contrahendo
or negotiando exists between the parties, the intent to be bound
should be expressed in “positive” rather than inferential terms;96 but
“[it would not be] for the Court to determine what shall be the final

89

See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. VI, July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, available at http://www.un.org/en/conf/
npt/2005/npttreaty.html (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”).
90
See Cassese, supra note 76, at 566 (noting the Declaration includes “a host
of pacta de contrahendo and also pacta de negotiando”) [footnote omitted]; see
also Ruth Lapidoth, Relation between the Camp David Frameworks and the
Treaty of Peace – Another Dimension, 15 IS. L.R. 191, 193 (1980) (noting “many
examples” of such agreements).
91
See Owada, supra note 76, at ¶ 31-32.
92
Cassese, supra note 76, at 566 n.6 (summarizing Beyerlin’s view).
93
See Beyerlin, Pactum de Contrahendo und Pactum de Negotiando im Völkerrecht?, supra note 28, at 415–17.
94
Cassese, supra note 76, at 566 n.6.
95
Kass, supra note 83, at 39.
96
See International Status of South-West Africa, supra note 82, at 140 (discussing whether the UN Charter articles 77 and 80 obligated mandatory powers
to negotiate placement of territory under the UN Trusteeship system).
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result . . . . It is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution”97 —provided the negotiations are meaningful and “‘pursue[d]
as far as possible with a view to concluding agreements’, even if an
obligation to negotiate did not imply an obligation to reach agreement.”98 Merely abiding by the formalities of a process of negotiation is not sufficient proof of good faith.99
The requirement of good faith in the performance of obligations
is well established in international law and in domestic legal systems.100 In civil law systems, a violation of good faith imputes fault,
which is expressed in the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo.101 Common law systems do not have an exact counterpart, but violations of
good faith find similar expression in doctrines of negligence, promissory estoppel, and implied contract.102 In international law, the
law of state responsibility would provide the legal means for demanding the implementation of the obligation to conclude an agreement,103 and although important scholars regard the obligation as an
absolute obligation,104 problems arise.
97
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7,
75 ¶¶ 139, 141 (Sept. 25).
98
North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, supra note 70, at 48, ¶ 87 (internal
quotations omitted); Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (Railway
Sector Landwarów-Kaisiadorys), Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
42 at 116 (Oct. 15); Claims Arising out of Decisions of the Mixed Graeco-German
Arbitral Tribunal Set up under Article 304 in Part X of the Treaty of Versailles
(Greece v. F. R. G.) 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 27, 57 (1972).
99
See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 70, at 47, ¶ 85.
100
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, Jan 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (pacta sunt servanda); Rogoff, supra note 28, at 144,
146 (discussing good faith in conventional, customary, and municipal legal systems).
101
Rogoff, supra note 28, at 146 n.21 (citing inter alia, the French Code
Civile).
102
See generally Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77
HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369–404 (1980);
Willard L. Boyd III & Robert K. Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-In-Law and
Implied-In-Fact Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims
Court, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 605 (1991).
103
See Cassese, supra note 76, at 566.
104
See David Simon, Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a Pactum
de Contrahendo and has Serious Legal Obligation by Implication, 2 U. PA. J.
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Articulating an operational standard that distinguishes good
faith performance from bad faith performance presents challenges
when applying the pacta.105 Enforcing this elusive standard internationally, for instance through a judicial order to specifically perform an agreement or to resume negotiations in good faith, also challenges the integrity of an international court or tribunal. Pacta de
contrahendo and negotiando are rudimentary expressions of agreement.106 At this base level, an agreement to agree at a later date
amounts to an agreement to postpone an agreement – a distinction
that may create the illusion of a good faith negotiation; it may serve
as a cosmetic façade, masking nothing more than the intention not
to reach an agreement.107 Some doctrinal treatments view them
skeptically. Stephen Kass argued “[e]ven when states are bound to
reach agreement, international law requires no more than good faith
efforts to fulfill that obligation.”108 Richard Baxter thought pacta
de contrahendo “empty” and “rhetorical,” and without appropriate
machinery in place, “no court or other agency can determine
whether a State has or has not negotiated in good faith and what the
duty . . . requires.”109 Myron Nordquist wrote that they are, “largely
declaratory of policy goals,”110 and [often] couched in the language
INT’L. L. 1, 4 (2005), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/2-1_Simon_David.pdf (citing McNair, Oppenheim, Lauterpacht, and
Hahn).
105
See Burton, supra note 102, at 369.
106
See Cassese, supra note 76, at 566.
107
Examples of categories of bad faith include the evasion of the spirit of the
agreement, lack of diligence and slacking off, willfully rendering only ‘substantial
performance,’ abuse of a power to specify terms, abuse of a power to determine
compliance, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. See Burton, supra note 102, at 369 n.5 (summarizing Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968)).
108
Kass, supra note 83, at 40.
109
R.R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”, 29 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 549, 552 (1980).
110
IV CENTER FOR OCEANS POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 668 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1982) quoted in Gaetan Verhoosel, Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development: Transfering Environmentally
Sound Technologies, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 54 (1988) (describing the
technology transfer provision of art. 14 of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea).
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of ‘guidelines’—not legally enforceable as a legal duty.111 Alternatively, U.S. President Calvin Coolidge, acting as sole arbitrator in
the Tacna-Arica Arbitration (1925), noted that a tribunal could nullify the original treaty based on one party’s intentional frustration of
the good faith obligation to negotiate.112 Of course, Coolidge was
aware the original treaty traced to a peace treaty113 and his rumination on a possible third party remedy for non-performance was kept
squarely in the realm of obiter dictum.114 But bad faith could not be
imputed from the failed implementation of a particular provision
alone; “something more must appear” and “should not be lightly imputed.”115 Clear and convincing evidence was required to support
the existence of bad faith, not disputable inferences.116 Chile seemingly suggested this latter point to no avail during the preliminary
stage, implying no meeting of the minds existed in support of a pactum de contrahendo and no measure of good faith in support of a
pactum de negotiando could force a result amenable only to Bolivia.
C.

Unilateral Declarations Distinguished from the Pacta
By definition, pacta de contrahendo and negotiando are distinct
from unilateral declarations, but they share many points of contact
involving the intent to be bound.117 Deciphering the binding effect
of unilateral declarations also involves consideration of their disputed consequences, factual circumstances, the clarity, consistency,
and specificity of the declarations, the context in which they are
made, and the authority on which they are based.118 This tangled

111

Simon, supra note 104, at 6 (citing Colin M. Alberts, Technology Transfer
and Its Role in International Environmental Law: A Structural Dilemma, 6 HARV.
J.L. & TECH, 63, 71 (1992)).
112
Tacna-Arica Question (Chile/Peru), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 921, 929 (Mar. 4,
1925) [hereinafter Tacna-Arica Question].
113
Id. at 928 (“the Treaty of Ancon was a peace treaty—the Parties were engaged in a devastating war”).
114
See id.
115
Id. at 930.
116
Id.
117
See Cassese, supra note 76, at 566.
118
See e.g. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application:
2002) (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Rwanda) Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. No. 126, 2829 ¶¶ 49-53.
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context, as President Coolidge noted in the failed Tacna-Arica Arbitration, required a thorough examination of the historical evidence
and diplomatic record,119 a difficult pathway that nevertheless invites the following review.
IV.
ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE
The dispute before the ICJ traces to the nineteenth century War
of the Pacific (1879-1884), which pitted Bolivia and Peru against
victorious Chile.120 In broader terms, the conflict originates with
Spain’s nineteenth century retreat from empire in the New World
and the fractious territorial disputes that followed the disintegration
of Spain’s three hundred year rule.121
A.
The Broader Issue: The Legacy of Spanish Imperial Rule in
the Americas
The Spanish conquest of the Americas introduced an administrative system to govern its vast holdings.122 The system was known
as “vice kingdoms,” or viceroyalties.123 Over time, the viceroyalties
grew to include four administrative divisions, a system of royal
courts (Las Reales Audiencias),124 and the Captaincy-General of
Chile.125 The appointed “vice-kings” exercised tremendous regional
119

See Tacna-Arica Question, supra note 112, at 930.
See generally WILLIAM F. SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY: FIGHTING THE WAR
OF THE PACIFIC, 1879-1884 (University of Nebraska, 2007), available at http://w
ww.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1djmdh2.
121
See generally CHRISTOPHER G. BATES, THE EARLY REPUBLIC AND
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL, CULTURAL,
AND ECONOMIC HISTORY (Routledge, Taylor, and Francis Group, 2015).
122
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 31.
123
Id.
124
See generally CHARLES HENRY CUNNINGHAM, THE AUDIENCIA IN THE
SPANISH COLONIES AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE AUDIENCIA OF MANILA, 1583-1800
(1919). The Audiencias (and their capitals) included the Audiencias of Panama
(Panama), Santa Fé (Bogotá), Quito (Quito), Lima (Lima), Charcas (La Paz), and
Chile (Santiago). See HEIDE V. SCOTT, CONTESTED TERRITORY: MAPPING PERU
IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 12 (2009).
125
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 31. Other CaptainciesGeneral existed, for example in Cuba, Guatemala, and Venezuela; while the latter
two achieved practical autonomy, only the Captaincy-General of Chile was
granted complete independence from its viceroy (of Peru) by order of the Spanish
120
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authority and autonomy, none more absolutist than Peru’s viceroy,
José Abascal, marqués de la Concordia (1808-16),126 but they also
represented the imperial ethos and prerogative power of the Spanish
Crown.127
Land under Spanish control north of the Isthmus of Panama became known as the viceroyalty of New Spain (1535), which consisted of Central America, Mexico, and parts of what would become
the western U.S., the Spanish Caribbean, and the Philippines.128 The
viceroyalty of Peru (1543) originally ruled throughout all of South
America, but it ceded territory to new viceroyalties as the Spanish
presence penetrated the Southern Hemisphere.129 It came to include
Bolivia (known as Alto Peru) and Chile.130 The viceroyalty of New
Granada (1718) consisted of Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador,131
and the viceroyalty of Río de la Plata (1776) consisted of Argentina,
Uruguay, and Paraguay.132 For a time, Bolivia/Alto Peru was transferred to the jurisdiction of Río de la Plata to shore up defenses
against the encroaching Portuguese,133 but it reverted to Peru in
1810, in Spain’s effort to consolidate dwindling power.134
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Spain nominally controlled the entire Pacific coast of South America.135 The Captaincygovernment, thus allowing it to exercise authority over the audiencia of Chile,
with its seat in Santiago. WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON, RISE OF THE SPANISHAMERICAN REPUBLICS AS TOLD IN THE LIVES OF THEIR LIBERATORS 6 (1921).
126
Timothy E. Anna, The Last Viceroys of Spain and Peru: An Appraisal, 81
THE AM. HIST. REV. 38, 43 (1976).
127
Id. at 41-42.
128
ROBERTSON, supra note 125, at 3.
129
Id. at 3-4.
130
See ST. JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 1.
131
ROBERTSON, supra note 125, at 4.
132
Id.
133
OSCAR CORNBLIT, POWER AND VIOLENCE IN THE COLONIAL CITY: ORURO
FROM THE MINING RENAISSANCE TO THE REBELLION OF TUPAC AMARU (17401782), 130 (1995).
134
Wars of Spanish-American Independence, LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY
OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 2015), http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore9780199366439-e-66.
135
Indians and Europeans on the Northwest Coast: Historical Context,
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, http://www.washington.
edu/uwired/outreach/cspn/Website/Classroom%20Materials/Curriculum%
20Packets/Indians%20&%20Europeans/II.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2016).
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General of Chile, one of the smallest and poorest colonies, contrasted starkly with the wealth of Peru and New Granada—“the two
jewels in Spain’s imperial crown.”136 Intense demand for New
World minerals and metals spread throughout the empire.137 Gold
and silver not shipped back to Spain were distributed unevenly, but
effectively enough to facilitate Spain’s lengthy rule.138 But a sense
of crisis enveloped the New World when word circulated in 1808
that the metropolitan power, already beset by popular uprisings, fell
to Napoleon.139 Its two Bourbon kings, Charles IV, and his son, Ferdinand VII, abdicated, and Napoleon put his brother, Joseph, on the
Spanish throne.140
i. The end of empire
A crisis of allegiance unfolded and the turmoil spurred pro-independence movements across South America, headed by El Libertador, Simón Bolivar (1783-1839) and José de San Martin (17781850).141 La Plata (Argentina) gained independence in 1810; Chile
in 1818; New Granada (Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela) in 1819; Peru in 1821; and Bolivia in 1825.142
The relatively rapid dissolution of the Spanish Empire in the
New World affected borders that stretched across thousands of

136

Christon I. Archer, 82(1) J. MOD. HIST. 221, 222 (2010) (reviewing
GABRIEL PAQUETTE, ENLIGHTENMENT, GOVERNANCE, AND REFORM IN SPAIN
AND ITS EMPIRE, 1759-1808).
137
See generally HUGH THOMAS, RIVERS OF GOLD: THE RISE OF THE SPANISH
EMPIRE (2003); see also LYLE N. MCALISTER, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN THE NEW
WORLD 1492-1700, at 227-30 (1984) (estimating sixteenth century gold and silver
production).
138
See Alejandra Irigoin & Regina Grafe, Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation-State and Empire Building, 88 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 173, 191
(2008) (discussing the imperial distribution of revenue).
139
Id. at 201.
140
Id. (summarizing historians’ view that the Bourbon kings’ forced abdication by Napoleon was the “turning point for the birth of modern republics in Spanish America”).
141
Simón Bolívar and José de San Martin, THE SAYLOR FOUNDATION,
https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/HIST303-4.3.2-Bolivar
-and-SanMartin-FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2016).
142
See PETER BAKEWELL, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA TO 1825 476
(Wiley-Blackwell 3rd ed. 2010).
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miles. But exact boundaries between viceroyalties or successor governments were inexactly defined because “colonial and post-colonial societies tended to cluster around a handful” of urban centers,
separated “by vast tracts of inhospitable, unproductive, and often
impassable land, jungles, mountains, and deserts.”143
ii. The application of uti possidetes
Against the backdrops of decolonization and emerging statehood, a rudimentary principle of Roman law won immediate favor.
To guard against contested boundary claims, emerging Latin American republics employed the principle of uti possidetis.144 The principle froze territorial title at the moment of independence, “no matter how arbitrary those boundaries may have been drawn.”145 As a
convenient means of quieting title, the principle ensured that colonial boundaries instantly became international boundaries for Latin
America’s new republics.146 It proved a costly means of securing
non-violent transitions to sovereignty,147 and it has been criticized
for its agnostic regard for the human populations disrupted by the
territorial divisions.148 But it has ‘kept its place’ among the most
important legal principles of international law.149
The principle’s “rote application,” which favored the status
quo,150 took two forms: uti possidetis juris pertained to border demarcations drawing from references to royal documents, or decrees
(cédulas), and uti possidetis de facto applied to territory actually
possessed.151 Variances in the administrative practices of Spanish
143

FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 32.
See Jan Klabbers & René Lefeber, Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 54
(Catherine Brölmann et al. eds., 1993).
145
Id.
146
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 31.
147
See Christopher R. Rossi, The Northern Sea Route and the Seaward Extension of Uti Possidetis (Juris), 83 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 476, 488 (2014).
148
See JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 10 (2003).
149
Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J., 567 ¶ 26 (Dec.
22) (“kept its place among the most important legal principles”).
150
Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders
of New States, 90 AM J. INT’L L. 590, 601 (1996).
151
See Giuseppe Nesi, Uti Possidetis Doctrine, OXFORD PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law144
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and Portuguese imperial holdings account for the distinction.152
However, “the borders between the various administrative units of
the Spanish Empire were never meant to be international boundaries” because they were vague, contradictory, and based on imprecise terms of travel and description “all done at a time when the accurate location of parallels of latitude was an inexact art and that of
finding longitude was an unfathomable mystery.”153 This maw of
undifferentiated boundaries transcended the Atacama Desert;154
Spanish colonial demarcations lacked precision in Patagonia, Tierra
del Fuego, the Amazon, and in the sprawling basins of the Orinoco
River.155 The viceroyal administrative system of the Spanish Empire turned out to be an “entirely inadequate” precursor to the arrival
of the state system in Latin America,156 more so in Africa.157
B.

The More Immediate Cause: The War of the Pacific
Following South America’s independence from Spain in the
early nineteenth century, Bolivia’s founding fathers, Simón Bolivar
and General Antonio José Sucre, claimed for Bolivia the barren Atacama Desert, partly to provide a buffer between Peru and Chile, and
partly to provide access to the Pacific Ocean through the tiny port at
Antofagasta.158 But Bolivia’s southern border with Chile relied on
9780199231690-e1125 (discussing the dual purposes of the term) (last updated
Jan. 2011).
152
See id. (“in particolare dal Brasile”).
153
FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 32.
154
See ROBERT N. BURR, BY REASON OR FORCE: CHILE AND THE BALANCING
OF POWER IN SOUTH AMERICA 1830-1905, at. 5 (1965).
155
Id. The dispute between Chile and Argentina over Patagonia resulted in an
award favoring Argentina in the Cordillera of the Andes Boundary Case (1902).
See The Cordillera of the Anders Boundary Case (Argentina/Chile), 9
U.N.R.I.A.A. 37 (Nov. 20, 1902).
156
BURR, supra note 154, at 5 (claiming Spanish colonial precedent as a
means of demarcating with precision administrative units “was entirely inadequate as a legal basis for determining their boundaries”).
157
See generally SAADIA TOUVAL, THE BOUNDARY POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICA (1972).
158
See Farcau, War of the Pacific, supra note 15, at 1624. The Bolivians referred to the coastline as the Departamento del Litoral. See also May 6 Public
Sitting, supra note 75, at 10, ¶ 3. But cf. Morales, supra note 45, at 78 (claiming
Bolívar designated the port of Cobija as Bolivia’s Pacific seaport in 1825). St.
John noted Bolivia quickly deemed the original port of Cobija inadequate, and far
removed from the most logical trade route to the Peruvian port of Arica; an 1826
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Spanish colonial maps of the Audiencia of Charcas (a colonial subdivision of the viceroyalty of Peru), which variously placed the border along the Salado River or the Copiapó River; and the course of
these rivers proved difficult to fix.159 Chile also made overlapping
historical claims,160 and its constitutions of 1822, 1823, 1828, and
1833 claimed all of the Pacific coast territory, but made no mention
of where its northern frontier ended.161 Peru, on three occasions
(1822, 1823, and 1825) recognized the need to demarcate its boundaries, but overriding territorial uncertainty forestalled efforts of its
congressional boundary commission to come to any conclusion.162
Bolivia and Peru disputed their frontiers between the Loa River in
the north and Tocopilla in the south.163 At the time of independence
in 1825, Bolivia “claimed a broad desert corridor between the Loa
River and the Salado River with Peru and Chile making conflicting,
overlapping claims to the north and south.”164 The only circumstance favoring these nascent republics and the enveloping border
confusion was the inhospitable terrain, which negated conflicts over
ownership.165 There was nothing to fight over, until reports surfaced

agreement between Peru and Bolivia secured Arica as a Bolivian port, but the
Peruvian Congress refused to ratify the agreement. “[I]t proved to be the only time
the Peruvian government ever agreed to give Arica to Bolivia.” ST. JOHN,
BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 3-4.
159
See ST. JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 3.
160
See LUIS BARROS BORGOÑO, THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC AND THE NEW
POLICIES OF BOLIVIA 45-55 (1924) (discussing, inter alia, references to Chile’s
historic title to and ‘possessory’ occupation of the Atacama Desert, including references to the Liberator Bolívar; Law V, Title 15, Book 2 of the Laws of the
Indies, November 1, 1681 organized by the Royal Audiencia of Lima, extended
on January 2, 1791; a 1793 report commissioned by the viceroy of Peru, don Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lémus; twenty jurisdictional acts of Chilean authority over
the desert region during the colonial period up to the beginning years of the nineteenth century, as recorded by historian Miguel Luis Amunátegui in THE
BOUNDARY QUESTION BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA (1863); and the authority
that emanates from “a true gem of national history,” the Epítome Chileno (1648)
published by Field marshal Santiago de Tesillo).
161
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 33.
162
See ST. JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 2.
163
Id. at 3.
164
Id.
165
SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 5-6.
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in the 1840s of valuable fertilizer deposits.166 Instead, the republics
focused on managing chaotic internal affairs, particularly Peru and
Bolivia, which were wracked by political instability more so than
Chile.167 But it was at this moment that a colonial boundary dispute
gained impetus as a territorial temptation, which thereafter has
“raised serious issues of economic development and regional hegemony.”168
i. A contributing factor: Bolivia’s late-stage development
By the mid-1800s, Bolivia was the weakest economy in the hemisphere.169 It was the last South American country to achieve independence (1825); it lacked democratic political tradition; it had no
manufacturing base; it had a vast and variegated landscape (bigger
than Texas and California); and it had a sparse population of perhaps
two million. 170 Eighty percent of the inhabitants did not speak Spanish,171 and seven-eighths of the population lived in five small cities
in the western highlands.172 It lacked the technology and finance
capital to connect by railway its capital, La Paz, situated in the Andes twelve thousand feet above sea level, to the nearest port in Arica,

166

See id.; Morales, supra note 45, at 79 (noting Chile did not seriously begin
challenging Bolivian sovereignty in the Atacama until after the first reports of
guano deposits in the 1840s). Cf. ST. JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS,
supra note 12, at 7 (noting Chilean indifference to the exact location of its northern border ended with the discovery of guano).
167
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 26 (comparing Chile’s
small civil wars and less serious rebellions to ‘revolving door’ political unease in
Peru and Chile). Sater notes whereas Chile elected four leaders over 40 years beginning in the 1830s (not without strife), Peru adopted six different constitutions
between 1823-30 and Bolivia underwent eleven regime changes and more than
100 revolutions between 1839-76. See WILLIAM F. SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY:
FIGHTING THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, 1879-1884, at. 15-16 (2007) [hereinafter
SATER, ANDEAN TRADEGY].
168
See Ronald Bruce St. John, Chile, Peru and the Treaty of 1929: The Final
Settlement, 8 IBRU BOUNDARY & SECURITY BULLETIN 91, 98 (2000), available
at https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb8-1_john.pdf.
169
FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 20-21.
170
Id. at 20-22.
171
Id. at 21.
172
See SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 12 (listing La Paz,
Oruro, Cochabamba, Sucre, and Potosí).
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Peru;173 travel time using the most direct route between La Paz and
the Pacific could take almost one month.174 But in 1857, huge deposits of guano and nitrates also were discovered in the Mejillones
region of the Atacama Desert, an area remote from Bolivia’s nascent
commercial infrastructure located on the Altiplano (highland plateau).175 The land suddenly became valuable to Chile and Bolivia,176
and potentially threatening to Peru’s monopoly control over
guano.177
ii. The condominium agreement of 1866
Elsewhere, European intrigues in the Western Hemisphere put
South American republics on high alert.178 Spain became a direct
concern again when it retook the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo) in 1861;179 suspicions heightened across South America
when the Spanish fleet rounded the southern tip of South America,
Cape Horn, and headed up the Pacific coast to Peru’s chief port,
Callao.180 A local incident provoked the “revindication” of Spanish
interests, and Spain seized Peru’s guano-rich Chincha Islands in
173
The port city is now the northernmost port of Chile. Chile is credited with
the engineering feat of connecting Arica to the Bolivian border, hence La Paz, by
rail, in fulfillment of one clause of the 1904 Peace Treaty.
174
SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 9-10.
175
See HERBERT S. KLEIN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF BOLIVIA 129 (2nd ed.
2011); BURR, supra note 155, at 89 (citing “vast new guano deposits in the Mejillones region”).
176
See MORALES, supra note 45, at 80 (noting Chile’s attempt to seize the
guano-rich Mejillones region, bringing Chile and Bolivia to the brink of war). See
SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 6.
177
The Chincha Islands off of Peru’s coast had provided the source of almost
all of the world’s supply of guano at this time, although, in addition to the Atacama Desert holdings, deposits later would be discovered in the Caribbean, on
Pacific Atolls, and off Australia. See Christopher R. Rossi, ‘A Unique International Problem’: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation from History, 15 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
93, 123 (2016).
178
With the U.S. consumed by civil war, politically unstable and weak Latin
American republics looked with alarm at French, British, and Spanish interventions in Mexico to make good on Mexican foreign debt. See BURR, supra note
154, at 90 (noting European interventions and particularly the French attempt to
establish a monarchy in Mexico “deeply shocked the entire hemisphere”).
179
Id.
180
Id.
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1864.181 Regional tensions, particularly between Chile and Bolivia
over the Mejillones region,182 were put aside and a quadruple alliance of the South American west coast states—Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru—formed to oppose successfully Spain’s irredentist
meddling.183 Following Spain’s defeat – its last grasp at empire in
South America—a brief period of amity facilitated an 1866 accord
between the governments of La Paz and Santiago (the Mutual Benefits Treaty).184 That agreement divided the contested Atacama territory at the 24th parallel South,185 granted exploitation rights to each
republic, and imposed a fiscal condominium arrangement over
“guano deposits [and minerals] discovered in Mejillones, and in all
such further deposits of this same fertilizer which may be discovered
in the territory comprised between 23° and 25° South latitude.”186
Tax revenue generated from mining interests in the area were to be
shared equally.187 Bolivia agreed to construct a customs house and
port facility at Mejillones and to use no other port for the export of
guano or minerals from the shared territory.188 An export duty exemption applied to all products produced between the 24° and 25°
latitude, and was extended to cover natural products Chile exported
through Mejillones.189 Other export duty assessments required the
181

See id. at 90–92 (recounting the ‘Talambo’ incident and the seizure of the
Chincha Islands).
182
In May 1863, the Bolivian National Assembly empowered the President to
declare war on Chile regarding Bolivia’s southern border and mineral dispute with
Chile. See ST. JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 8.
183
See BURR, supra note 155, at 99 (discussing formation of the quadruple
alliance); WILLIAM E. SKUBAN, LINES IN THE SAND: NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY
ON THE PERUVIAN-CHILEAN FRONTIER 8 (2007); ROBERT D. TALBOTT, A
HISTORY OF THE CHILEAN BOUNDARIES 35 (1974) (noting the subordination of
regional differences in the combined Peru/Bolivia/Chile/Ecuador alliance against
Spain). Spain would suffer a humiliating defeat against Chile’s navy (the Chincha
Island War), which would represent the last gasp of the Spanish Empire in South
America, save for remnant holdings of empire in Puerto Rico and Cuba.
184
See WILLIAM JEFFERSON DENNIS, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
TACNA-ARICA DISPUTE 49–50 (1927).
185
See id. (establishing a “line of demarcation . . . between Bolivia and Chile”
from the 24° South parallel subject to an exact survey to be undertaken).
186
See id. (discussing article 2).
187
See id; see also SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note
5, at 6.
188
See DENNIS, supra note 184, art. 3.
189
Id. art. 4.
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mutual agreement of the parties.190 The treaty also secured for the
parties a jus prohibendi pledge: Neither Chile nor Bolivia could
transfer their right of joint possession to another state, association or
individual,191 and remuneration for outstanding claims held in abeyance by previous political disruptions were to indemnified equally
by the two coparceners.192
It was a remarkable agreement– a historically important, but
now obscure attempt to share sovereignty. But it imploded under
the weight of fatal non-starters: it was made practical through a cooperative spirit—albeit a negative spirit directed against Spain rather than in support of mutual respect and regional accord. It fueled
the personal greed of Bolivia’s dictator, Mariano Melgarejo, who
had secret personal connections to Chile’s nitrate interests.193 It
ceded, from Bolivian perspectives, a disproportionate amount of Bolivian territory, including all claims south of the 25th parallel.194 And
it was predicated on a fictitious equality between the parties that appeared reasonable given the expansive, desolate environment.195 In
fact, Chile was much more capitalized than Bolivia by this time.196
British financiers fortified its corporate strength with a network of
heavy industries and rail lines,197 contributing to arguments that the

190

Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
192
Id. art. 7.
193
See MORALES, supra note 45, at 65.
194
Id. at 80–81 (particularly after the discovery of silver near Caracoles, in
territory south of the 25th parallel); Klein, supra note 176, at 133 (“justifiably condemned . . . for selling the nation to the highest bidder”).
195
See MORALES, supra note 45, at 80-81.
196
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 24-28.
197
See generally JOHN MAYO, BRITISH MERCHANTS AND CHILEAN
DEVELOPMENT 1851–1886 (1987); see also JOHN MAYO & SIMON COLLIER,
MINING IN CHILE’S NORTE CHICO: JOURNALS OF CHARLES LAMBERT 1825–1830,
at. 2 (1998) (noting the mining presence of more than forty British-organized companies as early as the 1820s); J. FRED RIPPY, BRITISH INVESTMENTS IN LATIN
AMERICA, 1822-1949: A CASE STUDY IN OPERATIONS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN
RETARDED REGIONS 133–41 (1966) (detailing British concessionaires in Chile’s
railway, telegraph, and nitrate industries).
191
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war ‘was more a British war against Peru using Chile as its instrument.’198 Chile benefited from a constellation of internal economic
growth factors, as well as relative demographic/linguistic homogeneity, a diversified agricultural economy, and an amenable geographic station, which promoted if not necessitated seafaring transit
and commerce.199 Indeed, Chile’s use of the Pacific Ocean as a highway to circumvent the Atacama wasteland to its north facilitated migration and played an important role in changing the region’s history.200 Ten thousand Chilean laborers accessed the Atacama
through its desert ports,201 ports essentially cut off from Bolivia’s
meagre and distant population centers in the Andean highlands.202
But fifty percent of Bolivia’s revenue depended on taxes from Atacama’s excavation ventures and the labor power provided by Chileans.203 Stemming the influx of these migrants presented difficult
economic repercussions for the cash-strapped Bolivian state.204 The
situation replayed problems involving the settlement of Texas, or
the northern frontier of New Spain in the 1820s.205 With encouragement of the Mexican government,206 settlers from the U.S. began to

198

See Heraclio Bonilla, The War of the Pacific and the National and Colonial
Problem in Peru, 81 PAST & PRESENT 92, 92-95 (1978) (summarizing a perspective from imperialist literature and quoting the 1882 view of the U.S. Secretary of
State).
199
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 24–26.
200
An important sub-chapter to the War of the Pacific involved the naval battles between Peru and Chile and the preceding arms race of the early 1870s between the republics to upgrade their respective fleets with British-built central
battery ironclads. In a minor footnote to international legal history, the Chilean
fleet included the wooden corvette, Abtao, a combination sail and steam engine
vessel that was the sister ship of the Confederate raider, Alabama, outfitted also
by British, and subject of one of the most famous cases in international law, the
Alabama Arbitration. See SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 96–116
(comparing the navies and also noting the Abtao).
201
Id. at 13.
202
See BORGOÑO, supra note 160, at 75 (noting specifically Antofagasta’s remoteness for Bolivians and Chile’s responsibility for its development).
203
See SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 13.
204
Id.
205
See generally Mark E. Nackman, Anglo-American Migrants to the West:
Men of Broken Fortunes The Case of Texas, 1821- 46, 5 W. HIST. Q. 441 (1974).
206
Id. at 445 (noting Mexico allowed expatriate American settlers in the country beginning in 1821).
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populate Teyshas/Tejas,207 and the rapid infusion of migrants threatened Mexican sovereignty; 208 within a generation a secession movement established Texas as a republic in 1836.209
Similarly, the northern migration of Chilean commerce, capital,
and labor quickly dominated the economics of the Atacama.210 This
Chilean migration would encroach on the nitrate fields of Peru’s
Tarapacá province,211 ultimately against Peru’s interests as well.
Immediately preceding the outbreak of war, the estimated ratio of
Chileans to Bolivians in the Atacama was seventeen to one.212 Chilean labor discontent caused an uprising in Mejillones in 1861, which
provoked a Bolivian threat to use force if its sovereignty was not
respected.213 In 1872, Bolivian forces put down an attempt by insurrectionists to seize Antofagasta; complaints of Chilean complicity
in the matter (The Paquete de los Vilos Affair) stirred Bolivian passions about the security of its entire littoral,214 and prompted a secret
mutual security pact with Peru.215 In 1879, Chilean ‘patriotic societies’ in the Atacama appealed to Santiago for relief from Bolivian
‘misrule.’216 The protection of Chilean nationals would factor into
the initiation of war.217
207

The ‘Texas’ region under Mexican rule between 1821–1836 derives from
the Caddo people. Its name was variously transcribed by the Spanish (tejas, tyshas, texias, thecas, techan teysas techas) before coming into English as Texas.
See Phillip L. Fry, Texas, Origin of Name, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, https://
tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/pft04 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
208
More than one hundred thousand Anglo-American settlers arrived in the
‘Texas’ region between 1821-1846. See Nackman, supra note 205, at 441 (noting
as well that expatriate Americans outnumbered Mexicans in the region by a factor
of ten (30,000:3,000) by 1835).
209
Id. at 445.
210
See BURR, supra note 154, at 119 (noting the “efficient and aggressive
business interests of Chile quickly began to exploit the [Atacama]”). Discovery
of a silver lode at Caracoles provoked a dispute about the demarcations of the
condominium zone. Id.
211
Id. at 131 (noting by 1875 that Tarapacá’s nitrate fields attracted more than
10,000 Chilean workers, engineers, and administrators and 20 million Chilean pesos in investment).
212
SATER ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 11.
213
See id. at 17.
214
See BURR, supra note 154, at 122–23.
215
See id. at 124 (discussing the 1873 secret treaty between Peru and Bolivia).
216
See SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 11.
217
Id.
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iii. Condominium rescinded
In 1871, Bolivian General Melgarejo was overthrown by Colonel Agustín Morales,218 and Bolivia rescinded the 1866 condominium agreement.219 In practice, the condominium failed almost from
the beginning.220 Although a mixed commission did map and demarcate uncharted areas,221 the treaty displeased both governments
from the outset; without the common enemy of Spain to deflect animosity, sentiments of “resentment and distrust” quickly returned.222
Bolivia began redirecting mineral exports above the 23rd parallel,
through Cobija to avoid revenue-sharing at the port of Mejillones;223
it withheld payment of half the customs receipts collected at Mejillones, and it refused to indemnify outstanding claims overtaken by
the condominium agreement.224 Chile objected to Bolivia’s selective
enforcement of the agreement,225 resented the treatment of its nationals, and chafed at the Bolivian disregard of direct investment
that was improving territory many Chileans regarded as historically
and rightfully theirs.226
Following failed diplomatic efforts to reinstate the condominium arrangement,227 which the Bolivian Congress again rejected
(the 1873 Lindsay-Corral Treaty), Chile proposed a settlement –the
1874 Boundary Treaty– that affirmed the 24th latitude as the border
with Bolivia,228 and abandoned the joint sovereignty arrangement in
exchange for Bolivia’s pledge of a twenty-five year moratorium on
imposts levied against Chilean corporate interests or excavated
218
See MORALES, supra note 45, at 67–68 (later General Morales); FARCAU,
THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 36.
219
See BURR, supra note 154, at 120.
220
Talbott argues “neither government found the treaty satisfactory at the time
it was signed” and “each nation returned to its former position of resentment and
distrust of the other.” TALBOTT, supra note 184, at 36–37.
221
See id. at 37.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 37-38.
225
Id.
226
See SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 9–10
(discussing Chilean attitudes against Bolivia).
227
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 36 (noting one unacceptable offer after another).
228
The new boundary was established at the 24th parallel south from the Pacific Ocean to the Cordillera of the Andes. See TALBOTT, supra note 183, at 38.
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products in the Atacama region.229 But Bolivia’s abrogation of the
1874 Boundary Treaty convinced the Moneda, Chile’s seat of executive power, to “revindicate” its rights,230 propelling the region into
war.
iv. The ten cents tax
A ten cents tax ignited the war. In 1873, Bolivia granted the
Chilean-owned Antofagasta Railroad and Nitrate Company (La
Compañía de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta) a concession to
mine nitrates in the Atacama.231 The Bolivian National Assembly
failed to immediately approve the decree, but the concessionaire
continued doing business.232 In 1878, Bolivia approved the 1873
decree, but added a ten cents tax per hundredweight of nitrates exported.233 The ten cents tax clearly violated the 1874 Boundary
Treaty and the 1873 concession contract,234 but Bolivia justified it
on the grounds that the dictator, Melgarejo, illegally concluded the
agreement in violation of domestic law.235
v. Chile’s geo-strategic concern
Chile’s attempts to accommodate Bolivia in the Atacama up to
this time reflected geo-strategic, not pan-Andean, concerns. A naval
armament race with Peru and serious border disputes with Argentina

229
SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 6; BURR,
supra note 155, at 130–31.
230
SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 7.
231
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 39.
232
Bolivia/Chile Pacific Access, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (June 24,
2011), http://www.coha.org/boliviachile-pacific-access/.
233
Historians have noted that the tax, in addition to generating revenue for
Bolivia, brought prices for Bolivian guano and nitrates more in line with price
hikes in Peru, which had nationalized its nitrate mines. Bolivia, with its secret
security pact with Peru, depended on Peru’s navy as a counterbalance to Chile’s
naval build-up and could not afford to provoke Peru by granting Chile more congenial allowances for mining interests that would undercut Peru’s price setting.
See TALBOTT, supra note 183, at 41-43.
234
See id. at 42–43 (discussing Article 4 of the 1874 treaty and Clause 4 of
the 1873 concession contract).
235
Id. at 43.
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made opening up a third foreign policy dispute with Bolivia unworkable.236 But Chilean balance of power calculations changed with
upgrades to its fleet, and although misconceived in terms of its naval
preparedness at the war’s onset,237 Chile quickly settled an outstanding border dispute with Argentina over Patagonia and the Straits of
Magellan (the Fierro-Sarratea Treaty) in January 1879,238 and turned
its full attention toward pressing Bolivia for an arbitral solution to
the Atacama dispute, as required by the 1874 treaty.239 Bolivia refused the request, effectively shut down concession operations, and
issued an ultimatum, promising to expropriate the Antofagasta Railroad and Nitrate Company concession if the taxes were not paid by
February 14, 1879.240 In a peremptory move, a Chilean militia of
two hundred invaded the port of Antofagasta on that day, encountered no resistance from Bolivian gendarmes (who had retreated on
orders of the prefect of the port), and immediately recruited a substantial number of disgruntled Chilean laborers as combatants from
the overwhelming stock of Chilean nationals who had been put out

236

Sater speculates that Bolivia’s president, General Hilarión Daza, imposed
the tax thinking the Moneda would be too preoccupied and “fearfully looking over
its shoulder toward Argentina,” thus affording Bolivia a propitious moment to
levy the tax against Chile. SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 55. See
also FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 41 (discussing Daza’s “serious miscalculation”).
237
See SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 107 (describing Chile’s
navy at the outbreak of war as “in various stages of disrepair”).
238
See BURR, supra note 154, at 134-135. The treaty ran into immediate problems regarding ratification in Buenos Aires. See GEORGE V. RAUCH, CONFLICT IN
THE SOUTHERN CONE: THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AND THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE
WITH CHILE, 1870-1902, at 167 (1999).
239
See TALBOTT, supra note 183, at 44.
240
Before the decree was to take effect, Bolivia shut down operations of the
company by preventing the loading of nitrates for export at the port, which caused
massive unemployment among Chilean stevedores. Bolivia also ordered the arrest
of the company’s manager, who sought asylum aboard a Chilean warship menacingly anchored in Antofagasta’s harbor, and ordered the seizure of 90,948 bolivianos and 13 centavos. Id. at 43–44. Chile dispatched two other warships in short
order. See also FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 42.
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of work by the de facto seizure of the concession.241 Mediation efforts failed.242 Bolivia declared war.243 Aware of Peru’s secret alliance with Bolivia, Chile demanded Peruvian neutrality, but Peru rejected the demand and Chile declared war on both countries on April
5, 1879.244
A most interesting prelude to the War of the Pacific, an intrigue
of such logical sense that Chile would propose it repeatedly during
the war, related to Chile’s attempt to sever Bolivia from its
longstanding relationship with Peru.245 It was an attempt to convert
Bolivia into an ally, and to cement an irreparable division between
Bolivia and Peru that would eliminate the threat of united opposition
to Chile’s north, cultivate Bolivia as an ally bordering Chile’s nemesis to the east, Argentina, while at the same time substituting Bolivia not only as Peru’s antagonistic neighbor to the south but as
Chile’s friendly buffer to the north.246 To accomplish these objectives, Chile proposed exchanging Bolivian sovereignty in the Atacama between the 23rd and 24th parallels for Bolivian ownership over
the coastal region of Arica above the Loa River— territory Chile did
not own,247 but would support Bolivia in securing.248 This proposal
sought to guarantee Bolivia its long sought after blue water port, not
at the remote and inaccessible Atacama sea outlets, but at the much
more proximate terminus at Arica. But Chile “could not cede what
it [at that time] did not own,” however appealing the thought of forcing Peru to pay Chile’s obligations.249
C.

Aftermath and the Failed Plebiscite
The War of the Pacific resulted in Chile’s three-year occupation
of Lima beginning in early 1881 and ultimately cost Peru its southernmost provinces, including the nitrate-rich provinces of Tarapacá
241

FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 42.
See BURR, supra note 154, at 136.
243
See SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 9.
244
BURR, supra note 154, at 136; WILLIAM JEFFERSON DENNIS, TACNA AND
ARICA: AN ACCOUNT OF THE CHILE-PERU BOUNDARY DISPUTE AND OF THE
ARBITRATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES 80–81 (1931).
245
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 36–37.
246
See BURR, supra note 154, at 140–41.
247
Id. at 141.
248
FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 37.
249
SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 224.
242
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and Arica.250 The peace agreement re-establishing relations between Peru and Chile, the Treaty of Ancón, placed the provinces of
Tacna and Arica under the control of Chile for ten years, after which
the questions of “dominium and sovereignty” were to be put to a
popular vote.251 The plebiscite dashed Bolivian dreams of securing
the port of Arica, “as Chile could not be expected to give Bolivia
territory which would separate Tarapacá from the rest of Chile.”252
A provision “kept from the public at the time, prohibited the cession
of any part of the territory in question to a third party [i.e., Bolivia]
without the consent of the signatories. . . . a point of bitter frustration for Bolivia to this day.”253 This jus prohibendi provision negotiated bilaterally by Peru and Chile in the Treaty of Ancón worked
against the interests of Bolivia in much the same way Chile and Bolivia used it to foreclose Peru’s presence in the Atacama with the
1866 condominium agreement. And attempts to hold the plebiscite
– a key feature of the peace agreement – met a fate similar to the
quick demise of the condominium agreement, which was to be held
ten years after the peace agreement had been concluded. Prior to the
expiration of Chile’s ten-year control of Tacna and Arica, Chile
fruitlessly attempted to purchase the territory in lump sum from
Peru.254 It then threatened the “‘Chileanization’ of the two provinces” through massive public works expenditures to entice twenty
thousand Chilean citizens to the regions,255 certainly with a mind
toward determining the outcome of the required plebiscite. Such
maneuvering stalled the plebiscite process. Attempts to hold the
plebiscite involved three U.S. administrations, a tortured series of

250

Farcau estimates the Chilean conquest of the Atacama and Tarapacá regions garnered for Chile close to three billion pesos in nitrate exports within
twenty years. See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 194.
251
See Treaty of Ancón, supra note 8 (discussing Article 3).
252
ST. JOHN, BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 15-16.
253
FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 198-99.
254
BURR, supra note 154, at 180.
255
See id. at 190; see generally Alberto Díaz Araya, Problemas y Perspectivas
Sociohistóricas en el Norte Chileno: Análisis Sobre la “Chilenización” de Tacna
y Arica, in 5 SI SOMOS AMERICANOS. REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS TRANSFRONTERIZOS
49-81 (2003).
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negotiations, Coolidge’s failed arbitration, and ultimately the repudiation of the promise to hold the plebiscite altogether.256 The failure of this plebiscite—itself a failed pactum de contrahendo—complicated regional relations. It served as a sly reminder of difficulties
awaiting Bolivia in its quest to secure performance by Chile of an
alleged pactum involving quite possibly the same disputed territory.
Chile subsequently returned the province of Tacna in 1929, which
now forms Peru’s southernmost border with Chile and Bolivia, but
it kept the port and province of Arica.257 “[T]he only party that

256

A series of negotiations begun by the US Harding Administration led to
failed arbitrations commencing in 1925 with US President Calvin Coolidge serving as arbitrator, followed by ‘Plebiscitary Commissioners’ Generals John J. Pershing and William Lassiter in succession. See DENNIS, supra note 244, at 225,
282. Sater claims successive Chilean governments stalled then refused to hold the
plebiscite, fearful Peru would win. See SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE
PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 224. Ultimately, no plebiscite was held, and under the
auspices of the US Hoover Administration, an agreement was reached: Tacna reverted to Peru and Arica to Chile. See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note
2, at 198.
257
See Treaty between Chile and Peru for the Settlement of the Dispute Regarding Tacna and Arica (the Treaty of Lima) art. 2, Bol.-Chile, June 3, 1929,
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18616.pdf (translated in Obligation to
Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection,
2014 I.C.J., Annex 11, at art. 2 (July 15)) [hereinafter the Treaty of Lima].Like
the Treaty of Ancón, the supplementary protocol established a jus prohibendi,
precluding Chile and Peru, without previous agreement, from ceding to any third
power territories pertaining to the treaty (i.e., Tacna and Arica)). The maritime
boundary implications of the Treaty of Lima later became an issue of dispute between the two countries, resulting in a partial delimitation by the ICJ in 2014. See
Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 2014, 10 ¶ 1 (Jan.
27), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/137/17930.pdf. The judgment retained the
border for the first 80 miles offshore but partially redrew the demarcation thereafter, awarding to Peru more than half of the thirty-seven thousand square miles
it originally sought. See Adriana Leon & Chris Kraul, Peru Wins Maritime Border
Dispute with Chile Over Key Fishing Grounds, LA TIMES (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/27/world/la-fg-wn-peru-territorial-disputechile-20140127. The settlement of the maritime claim has been followed by yet
another dispute over a nine acre (37,610 sq. meter) “land triangle” in the La
Yarada-Los Palos district of Tacna involving overlapping claims by Chile and
Peru based on competing interpretations of the 1929 Treaty of Lima. See Boundary Tensions Between Peru and Chile Continue, IBRU BOUNDARY NEWS (Oct.
22, 2015), https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=25974&re
href=%2Fibru%2Fnews%2F&resubj=Boundary+news+Headlines.
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might have protested the Treaty” – Bolivia – “was allowed no role
in the negotiations.”258
The outcome for Bolivia was even more devastating. The war
cost Bolivia 250 miles (400km) of its Pacific coastline – all of its
coastline, in fact – including the province of Atacama, its largest
port-city capital, Antofagasta, and its four other outlets to the
ocean—Mejillones, Cobija, Huanillo and Tocopilla; Bolivia lost
108,000 square miles of mineral-rich land in the Atacama Desert
(territory almost the size of Nevada), which Chile annexed.259 It altered collective memories as well as boundaries.260 The defeat
transformed Bolivians instantly into a nation of landlubbers. Its
landlocked status weighs heavily on its national conscience and
economy today,261 and compels the Bolivian navy to maintain its
fleet of ninety vessels, four thousand six hundred personnel, two
thousand marines and naval aviation accompaniment in the brown
water ports of Lake Titicaca and on other internal waterways262 in
wishful anticipation of a change in political fortune that will provide
pelagic purpose to its admiralty. Ironically, Bolivia did not even
258

Gordon, supra note 17, at 323.
See Christopher Woody, Chile and Bolivia are still arguing over the outcome of a war they fought 131 years ago, THE BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/chile-bolivia-sea-access-land-dispute-2015-10.
260
See SATER, ANDEAN TRADEGY, supra note 167, at 1.
261
See JONATHAN R. BARTON, A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LATIN AMERICA
65 (1997). Bolivia has indirect access to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans via Chile,
Peru, Paraguay, and Brazil; most exports and imports go through the Chilean ports
of Antofagasta and Arica on the Pacific, as well as through the Peruvian ports of
Ilo Mollendo, Tachna, and Matarini (via Brazil’s ports of Belem and Santos). See
Daniel Arthur McCray, Eternal Ramifications of the War of the Pacific, 4 (2005)
(graduate thesis, University of Florida), http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0009403/mccr
ay_d.pdf.
262
See ERIC WERTHEIM, THE NAVAL INSTITUTE GUIDE TO COMBAT FLEETS
OF THE WORLD, 16TH EDITION, THEIR SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND SYSTEMS 52 (16th ed.
2013). Deprived of a coast to protect, the Armada Boliviana patrols 10,000 miles
of internal waterways, principally three internal basins, including the Amazon basin, involving the Ichilo, Mamore Itenez, Yacuma, Orthon, Abuna, Beni and Madre de Dios rivers, the central basin, comprising Lake Titicaca, and the Del Plata
basin, including the Paraguay and Bermejo rivers. Advanced sea training is carried out in Argentina and Peru, which, pursuant to a 2010 agreement between the
Presidents of Peru and Bolivia, granted Bolivia a small port near the Peruvian port
of Ilo. See STEPHEN SAUNDERS, IHS JANE’S FIGHTING SHIPS 2014-2015, at 68-69
(116th rev. ed., 2014).
259
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have a navy to deploy during the War of the Pacific263 (the Armada
Boliviana was founded in 1963);264 it offered instead Letters of
Marque and Reprisal to hire privateers to cruise against the Chileans.265 The plan failed, leaving its ally, Peru, to battle the Chilean
ironclads alone,266 which it did until Chile destroyed Peru’s armada
in early 1881.267
The annexation secured for Chile a monopoly over the world’s
supply of nitrates, a commodity as valuable then as oil is today.268
Nitrates were essential to the manufacture of gunpowder and made
more lucrative because of a new use for it found by Alfred Nobel in
1867: Dynamite.269 Overall, the war increased the size of Chile by
one-third270 and the Atacama would later reveal repositories of some
of the world’s richest copper deposits.271
263

See FARCAU, WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 15, at 1625.
See SAUNDERS, supra note 262, at 68.
265
Letters of Marque vexed international relations at sea for centuries, due to
their loose supervision. The practice was outlawed only among signatories by the
1856 Paris Declaration, which Bolivia refused to sign. For the text of the Declaration, see generally Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Fr-U.K., Apr. 16,
1856, T.S. No. 9; Hisakazu Fujita, 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime
Law, in THE LAW OF THE NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND
DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 61-65 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988). For a discussion of its abuse, see Todd Emerson Hutchins, Structuring a Sustainable Letters of Marque Regime: How Commissioning Privateers Can Defeat the Somali
Pirates, 99 CAL. L. REV. 819, 855 (2011).
266
For a comparison of Chilean and Peruvian navies during the War of the
Pacific, see SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra 167, at 96-116.
267
See id. at 117-69 (describing the naval encounters during the War of the
Pacific, encounters that demonstrated effective use of contact mines, torpedoes,
and submarines).
268
STEPHEN R. BOWN, A MOST DAMNABLE INVENTION: DYNAMITE,
NITRATES, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 4, 162 (2005).
269
Id. at 162 (noting Chile’s virtual control over the entire global supply of
industrial-scale commercial nitrates on the cusp of the world’s greatest increase
in demand); id. at 82 (discussing demand for dynamite immediately following its
invention).
270
See SATER, CHILE AND THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC, supra note 5, at 1-2.
271
See SATER, ANDEAN TRAGEDY, supra note 167, at 1. Bolivia’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs estimated Chile earned more than 900 billion USD in copper exports from the Atacama since 1879. Lo Que Gana Chile y Pierde Bolivia Por No
Tener Acceso al Mar, CORREO DEL SUR (May 6 2015), http://www.correodelsur.
com/politica/20150506_lo-que-gana-chile-y-pierde-bolivia-por-no-tener-accesoal-mar-.html (quoting David Choquehuanca). Chile produces almost a third of the
264
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Bolivia signed an armistice – the Truce Pact – on April 4,
1884.272 Pending a final settlement, Chile retained territories from
the 23rd parallel South to the mouth of the Loa River (at the 21st parallel South).273 Commercial relations and customs exemptions for
natural products were re-established, with Bolivia receiving free
transit for goods introduced via the port of Antofagasta.274 Bolivia
received port access to Arica, but with conditions attached until outstanding obligations to Chile were satisfied, after which, Bolivia
would be able to establish its own internal customs office, allowing
foreign goods to transit freely through Arica.275
The 1904 Peace Treaty re-established peaceful relations between Bolivia and Chile.276 Bolivia recognized Chilean sovereignty
over coastal territory that had been Bolivian.277 Chile granted Bolivia in perpetuity a right of commercial free transit to the Pacific
and at Chilean ports,278 together with the right to establish Bolivian
customs posts at Chilean ports.279 Chile also agreed to build and pay
for a railway from Arica (Chile’s northernmost port) to the plateau
of La Paz,280 to guarantee obligations incurred by Bolivia to attract
railway investment, to settle debts associate with coastal territory
that had been Bolivian, and to make a substantial cash payment to
Bolivia.281

world’s copper; the vast majority of that copper comes from the Collahuasi, Chuquicamata and Radomiro Tomic, Escondida, and Los Pelambres mining operations in the Atacama. See Christopher Woody, Chile and Bolivia are Still Arguing
Over the Outcome of a War they fought 131 Years Ago, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct.
4, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/chile-bolivia-sea-access-land-dispute2015-10.
272
See 1884 Truce Pact, supra note 8.
273
Id. ¶ 2.
274
Id. ¶ 5.
275
Id. ¶ 6.
276
See 1904 Peace Treaty, supra note 7, at art. I.
277
Id. at art. II.
278
Id. at art. VI.
279
Id. at art. VII.
280
Id. at art. III.
281
See 1904 Peace Treaty, supra note 7, at arts. III, V, IV.
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But the 1904 Treaty cemented the loss of the Atacama Desert,
psychologically scarring Bolivia’s national identity.282 It came on
the heels of a rebellion that forced Bolivia to cede the southeast rubber-rich Acre region to Brazil (Treaty of Petropólis, 1903).283 Three
decades later, Bolivia clashed with Paraguay over control of the oilrich Gran Chaco region;284 the war lasted from 1932-1935, contained Bolivian elements of an unrealistic dream to access the Atlantic Ocean via the Paraguay River,285 claimed one hundred thousand lives, wounded one hundred and fifty thousand, and became
the bloodiest war in modern Latin American history and the bloodiest hemispheric war since the U.S. Civil War.286 It officially concluded with the Treaty of Buenos Aires (1938), which awarded
twenty thousand square miles of oil and gas fields to Paraguay.287
Bolivia has disputed boundaries with all of its neighbors and it has
lost most if not all of its disputes.288 But the focal point of its foreign
policy and national identity distills to the loss of the Atacama and
the corridor it once provided to the sea.289 It serves as a constant
282

GISBERT, supra note 44, at 242 (declaring: “El mar se convirtió en el gran
cohesionador spiritual del país” and the loss of access to it “un Tatuaje en el alma
de Bolivia”).
283
See generally Treaty of Petropólis, Braz.-Bol., Nov. 17, 1903, 698
U.N.T.S. 246.
284
See FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR, supra note 2, at 193.
285
Id. at 192-93.
286
See BRUCE W. FARCAU, THE CHACO WAR: BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY,
1932-1935, ix (1996) (noting 100,000 men killed out of a total combined population of less than five million); WILLIAM R. GARNER, THE CHACO DISPUTE: A
STUDY OF PRESTIGE DIPLOMACY 107 (1966) (citing 55,000 Bolivian deaths and
83,000 injured and 45,000 Paraguayan deaths and 67,000 injured); Paul H. Lewis,
Paraguay Since 1930, in 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 233, 234
(Leslie Bethell ed., 1991) (declaring the Chaco War the “bloodies war in Latin
American history”); DAVID H. ZOOK, JR., THE CONDUCT OF THE CHACO WAR 23
(1960) (labeling it “the hemisphere’s greatest struggle since the American Civil
War).
287
Frank Jacobs, How Bolivia Lost Its Hat, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 3,
2012), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/how-bolivia-lost-its-hat
/?_r=0.
288
Bolivia unquestionably lost the War of the Pacific against Chile, the Acre
War against Brazil, and the Chaco War against Paraguay; its defeat along with
Peru in the War of the Confederation involved a coalition of opposing forces that
included Chileans, Peruvians, and Argentines.
289
See EL LIBRO DEL MAR, supra note 55, at 19 (“Ninguna controversia internacional o conflagración bélica que afrontó Bolivia en su historia ocasionó una
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historical reminder of the poverty of the doctrine of uti possidetis
despite its necessity, and the limited utility of competing historical
narratives based on factual circumstances (les effectivités). These
narratives tend to rely on evidence scattered along an historical arc
of parochialism, confusion, and indeterminacy; as international arbitrators once opined, they can be voluminous in quantity, but sparse
in useful content.290 Reliance on competing pre- and post-colonial
narratives formed part of Bolivia’s case before the ICJ.291 But the
turbulent yet unavoidable history of uti possidetis suggests that the
‘revindication’ of Bolivia’s interests will follow a different legal
route – a route alternatively informed by the application of pacta de
contrahendo or negotiando, or a claim involving legal consequences
associated with Chilean declarations.
V. BOLIVIA’S APPEAL TO ACCUMULATIVE EVIDENCE AND JUDGE
GREENWOOD’S QUESTION
During oral proceedings, Judge Christopher Greenwood posed
the following question to Bolivia’s lawyers: “On what date does Bolivia maintain that an agreement to negotiate sovereign access was
concluded?”292 Unlike the argument of Chile’s counsel, who emphasized a need to show when the obligation crystallized,293 Boliva’s counsel pointed to an “accumulation of successive acts by
pérdida tan importante como la Guerra del Pacífico.”); GISBERT, supra note 44,
at 241-42 (“Es que ni en el Acre ni en el Chaco habíamos perdido nuestra cualidad
y acceso a las cuencas del Amazonas y del Plata, en cambio en la Guerra con Chile
perdimos la cualidad marítima y el acceso a la Cuenca de Pacífico, cuya importancia es central en la economía mundial del siglo XXI”).
290
Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute, (Eri. v.Yemen), 22
U.N.R.I.A.A. 209, at ch. VII, ¶ 239 (Oct. 9, 1998).
291
Documents prepared and submitted to the ICJ post- and pre-date Bolivia’s
independence from Spain and date to ancient times and the connections the Tiwanaku and Aymara peoples. EL LIBRO DEL MAR, supra note 55, 23-33 (examples
of Bolivia’s historical account).
292
May 6 Public Sitting, supra note 75, ¶ 31, at 60 (verbatim record of Judge
Greenwood).
293
May 7 Public Sitting, supra note 56, ¶ 4, at 32 (“Mais alors, de cet engagement,on ne sait toujours pas davantage à partir de quel moment ses différents éléments constitutifs sont réputés avoir atteint la phase de cristallisation nécessaire à
la formation d’une obligation juridique, au-delà de simples pourparlers diplomatiques?”) (verbatim record of M. Dupuy).
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Chile,”294 arguing no principal of international law requires a “magical moment when agreements or understandings appear out of nothingness, like the story of creation.”295
Bolivia’s appeal to the accumulative evidence implies a reliance
on historical evidence (effectivités) dating to colonial rule, but centers on affirmations by Chilean officials, noting, the ‘particularly
important’ Treaty on the Transfer of Territories of May 18, 1895,296
its protocol,297 and a litany of subsequent official pronouncements.298 With the 1895 Transfer of Territories document, Chile
pledged to acquire dominion over Tacna and Arica and to “transfer
them to” Bolivia by way of compensation of five million silver pesos.299 Failing that acquisition, Article 4 of the protocol recorded
294
May 8 Public Sitting, supra note 50, ¶ 9, at 33-34 (verbatim record of Mr.
Akhavan).
295
Id. ¶ 9, at 33. But see J. Klabbers & R. Lefeber, supra note 145, at 568
(1993) (discussing uti possidetis’ immediate application, thus freezing territorial
title at the critical date of independence); Frontier Dispute, supra note 150, ¶¶ 2627, at 109 (describing uti possidetis as ‘photographing’ the territorial situation;
“freez[ing] territorial title; and “stop[ping] the clock” but not putting back the
hands). Bolivia’s rejection of a ‘magical moment’ signifying the crystallization of
its claim distinguishes its argument from other examples involving the binding
effect of unilateral declarations.
296
Treaty on Transfer of Territory Between Bolivia and Chile (the 1895
Treaty), Bol.-Chile, May 18, 1895, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18616
.pdf (translated in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia
v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, 2014 I.C.J., Annex 3, (July 15)) [hereinafter
1895 Treaty].
297
Protocol on the Scope of the Obligations Agreed Upon in the Treaties of
18 May between Bolivia and Chile (the December 1895 Protocol), Bol.-Chile,
Dec. 9, 1895, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18616.pdf (translated in
Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, 2014 I.C.J., Annex 4, (July 15)) (binding Chile to “make use of
all legal measures . . . so as to acquire the port and territories of Arica and Tacna,
with the unavoidable purpose of ceding them to Bolivia . . . “) [hereinafter 1895
Protocol].
298
See EL LIBRO DEL MAR, supra note 55, 53-64 (cataloging Bolivian claims
regarding Chilean presidents, foreign ministers, and ambassadors who undertook
to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea with Bolivia).
299
See 1895 Treaty, supra note 296, at 91-97 (noting in the preamble agreement between Chile and Bolivia “that a higher need and the future development
and commercial prosperity of Bolivia require its free and natural access to the
sea,” and in art. 1 that if Chile acquired dominion over Tachna and Arica through
a plebiscite, “it undertakes to transfer them to . . . Bolivia” in return for compensation).
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that “the said obligation undertaken by Chile will not be regarded as
fulfilled, until it cedes a port and zone that fully satisfies the current
and future needs of Bolivian trade and industry.”300 Although the
agreements were signed, the Congresses of both states failed to approve the protocols; and in an 1896 exchange of notes, both countries agreed they were “wholly without effect.”301
In 1910, Bolivian Foreign Minister Daniel Sánchez Bustamante
restated the logic and justice of establishing an ocean passageway
through Arica; 302 he noted that Chile and Peru “should no longer be
neighboring countries” and that Bolivia more properly should be the
territorial sovereign of an intermediate buffer zone (containing “at
least one convenient port”) for the stability of Hispanic-American
nations.303 He later wrote Arica was “the natural port of Bolivia.”304
Bolivia claimed this memorandum reaffirmed expectations of a title
transfer that had been created by Chile, which had survived the conclusion of the 1904 Peace Treaty.305 A 1920 protocol signed by Bolivian and Chilean Foreign Ministers “agreed to . . . exchange general ideas” and acknowledged “the aim of reaching an agreement
300
See 1895 Protocol, supra note 297, at 108 (mentioning specifically the
small port of Vítor or an analogous inlet).
301
Note from Adolfo Guerrero, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, to
Heriberto Gutierrez, Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia
in Chile (Apr. 29, 1896), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18616.pdf
(translated in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v.
Chile), Preliminary Objection, 2014 I.C.J., Annex 6 (July 15)); also see Note from
Heriberto Gutiérrez, Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia
in Chile, to Adolfo Guerrero, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, (Apr. 20,
1896), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18616.pdf (translated in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, 2014 I.C.J., Annex 7 (July 15)).
302
Memorandum from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Daniel
Sánchez Bustamante, (Apr. 22, 1910), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/1
8616.pdf (translated in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, 2014 I.C.J., Annex 8 (July 15)).
303
Id.
304
José E. Pradel B., Daniel Sánchez Bustamante y el Memorándum de 1910,
EL DIARIO NUEVOS HORIZONTES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.eldiario.net/noticias
/2014/2014_11/nt141104/nuevoshorizontes.php?n=5&-daniel-sanchez-bustaman
te-y-el-memorandum-de-1910 (noting the memorandum “demostraba además la
vinculación real del Puerto de Arica con Bolivia” and that “Arica, siendo como es
el puerto natural de Bolivia, y solo de Bolivia”).
305
See Application to Negotiate Access, supra note 1, ¶¶ 14, 17.
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pursuant to which Bolivia could satisfy its aspiration of obtaining its
own access to the Pacific [independent of the 1904 Peace Treaty];”
article IV read: “Chile is willing to ensure that Bolivia acquires its
own access to the sea, by ceding an important part of that area north
of Arica and of the railway line that is located in the territories that
are the object of the plebiscite provided for in the Treaty of Ancón.”306 Bolivia later claimed in a 1950 Exchange of Notes (reaffirmed in a memorandum in 1961)307 that this 1920 Acta Protocolizada represented Chile’s acceptance of the transfer to Bolivia of
access to the Pacific Ocean, along with the ‘clear direction’ of
Chile’s international policy.308 The Chilean Foreign Ministry note
indicated that Chile “has been willing to consider, in direct negotiations with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying” Bolivia’s aspirations
and in a spirit of fraternal friendship “is willing to formally enter
into a direct negotiation aim[ed] at finding the formula which would
make it possible to grant Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean and for Chile to obtain compensations that are not of
a territorial nature . . . .”309 This latter expression appears to be the
sturdiest of the wet reeds on which leans Bolivia’s pactum de contrahendo argument.
Bolivia has recounted numerous attempts over the last century
to demonstrate Chile’s intent to negotiate a sovereign access, but
many of them seem to blur the distinction between a duty to negotiate and a duty to agree. In 1926, for instance, U.S. Secretary of
State, Frank B. Kellogg, fielded an inquiry from Chilean Ambassador, Miguel Cruchaga, to Washington about the prospect of ceding
Tacna to Peru, Arica to Chile, and a four-kilometer wide corridor
between Arica and Los Palos, Peru to Bolivia.310 Shortly after, Kellogg delivered to Chile and Peru a memorandum in 1926 offering
306

Id. at Annex 9, at 44 (Protocol (“Acta Protocolizada”) Subscribed between
the Foreign Affairs Minister of Bolivia, Carlos Gutiérrez, and the Extraordinary
Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Republic of Chile, Emilio Bello
Codesido 10 January 1920).
307
See id. at Annex 12, at 50 (Memorandum from the Embassy of Chile in La
Paz, 10 July 1961).
308
See id. at Annex 10, at 46 (Note of 1 June 1950 from the Ambassador of
Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile [Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez]).
309
See id. at Annex 11, at 48 (Note of 20 June 1950 from the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Ambassador of Bolivia [Horacio Walker Larraín])
310
See EL LIBRO DEL MAR, supra note 55, at 38.
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the good offices of the U.S. to help find a solution to the stalled
plebiscite disposition of Tacna and Arica.311 Of the three possible
dispositions of the res contemplated – assign it to one or the other;
divide it; or “effect some arrangement whereby neither contestant
shall get any of the territory,” only the third option contained the
essential element of compromise that made sense to him; he suggested the voluntary but compensated ceding of the provinces of
Tacna and Arica to Bolivia.312 Bolivia claims Chilean Foreign Minister, Jorge Matte, confirmed Chile’s willingness to grant a strip of
territory and a port to Bolivia once the definitive possession of
Tacna and Arica was clarified.313 In fact, Matte wrote “the Chilean
Government would honor its declarations in regard to the consideration of Bolivian aspirations,” but declared that Kellogg’s suggestion “goes much farther than the concessions which the Chilean
Government has generously been able to make.”314
In 1975 Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet and Bolivian President
Hugo Banzer met in the Bolivian border town of Charaña, where
Pinochet offered Bolivia a small strip of ‘demilitarized’ land between Arica and the Peruvian border (extending into the territorial
sea) in exchange for equivalent territorial compensation taken from
the Bolivian Altiplano.315

311

Frank B. Kellogg, Tacna-Arica, 89 ADVOCATE OF PEACE THROUGH
JUSTICE 55, 55 (1927).
312
Id. at 56–57.
313
EL LIBRO DEL MAR, supra note 55, at 39.
314
Id. at 120 (Memorandum issued by the Chancellor of Chile Jorge Matte to
the Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg of 30 November 1926).
315
See Note from Patricio Carvajal Prado, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, to Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguia, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Ambassador of Bolivia in Chile (Dec. 19, 1975), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/153/18620.pdf (translated in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific
Ocean (Bolivia v Chile), Preliminary Objection of the Republic of Chile, 2014
I.C.J. vol. 3, Annex 52, at 767 (July 15)) (“Chile would be willing to negotiate
with Bolivia the cession of a strip of territory north of Arica up to the Línea de la
Concordia”); see Protocol to Seek an Arrangement to Put an End to the War of
the Pacific (Feb. 13, 1884), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18618.pdf
(translated in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v
Chile), Preliminary Objection of the Republic of Chile, 2014 I.C.J. vol 2, Annex
14, at 265-273 (July 15)). The Chilean plan also demanded recognition of Chile’s
right to use the Rio Lauca. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 325. The ICJ recognized
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Bolivia reconsidered and ultimately balked at the idea of further relinquishing land to obtain territory improperly seized to begin
with.316 Additionally, the jus prohibendi provision in the 1929
Treaty of Lima required Peruvian consent, which was not given.317
Peru President General Francisco Morales Bermúdez offered in
1976 a counterproposal: a zone of tripartite sovereigns between the
city of Arica and the Peruvian border, “with Bolivia receiving a corridor feeding into this zone.”318 Peru’s plan masterfully reinserted
its parochial interests into the buffer zone while offering “Bolivia at
least as much as the Chileans had.”319 Chile regarded the trilateral
economic development of the territory as an undue complication and
rejected the proposal.320 Citing Chile’s lack of sincerity, Bolivia
broke diplomatic relations in March 1978,321 and the diplomatic impasse remains to this date.
Attempts to resolve this dispute have historically oscillated between bilateral and trilateral negotiations, but Bolivia also has attempted periodically to internationalize the discussion. It sought a
revision of the 1904 Peace Treaty through an appeal to the League
of Nations in 1920,322 which declared the complaint inadmissible
because the League Assembly lacked capacity to modify any
treaty.323 It approached the Non-Aligned movement,324 and the Organization of American States (OAS), first in 1962 by linking the
these negotiations in a separate case before the ICJ involving a maritime delimitation dispute between Chile and Peru. See Maritime Dispute, supra note 257, ¶¶
131-133.
316
See St. John, supra note 168, at 94-95.
317
See id. at 95.
318
Id.
319
Gordon, supra note 17, at 325.
320
See St. John, supra note 168, at 94-95.
321
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 327.
322
See Letter from the Delegates of Bolivia to the League of Nations to James
Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations (Nov. 1,1920),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18618.pdf (translated in Obligation to
Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Boliva-Chile), 2014 I.C.J. vol 2, Annex
37, at 579 (July 15)); see FIGUEROA, supra note 37, at 43-58 (discussing Bolivia’s
efforts to secure a review by the League of Nations).
323
League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Jurists on the Complaints
of Peru and Bolivia (Sept. 21, 1921), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/186
18.pdf (translated in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (BolivaChile), 2014 I.C.J. vol 2, Annex 39, at 593 (July 15)).
324
See FIGUEROA, supra note 37, at 144.
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Lauca River issue to access to the sea,325 then on the occasion of the
hundredth anniversary of the War of the Pacific in 1979,326 and periodically thereafter. The OAS has approved resolutions encouraging the parties to find a formula for giving Bolivia a sovereign outlet
to the Pacific Ocean while taking account of the rights and interests
of all parties involved.327 The parties returned to numerous bilateral
meetings in Uruguay (the “Fresh Approach” meetings, 1986-87), at
the XIII Ibero-American Summit in Bolivia (2003), at the Monterrey
Summit of the Americas (2004), on four occasions in 2005, (New
York, Salamanca, Mar del Plata, and Montevideo).328 During the
Sixty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly in
2012, Bolivia affirmed that bilateral options remained open with
Chile;329 Chile responded by declaring Bolivia lacks any legal basis
for claiming a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean by territories

325

See Wehner, supra note 23, at 11 (discussing Bolivia’s OAS claim linking
of the 1962 Lauca River dispute with Chile to the question of its access to the sea).
326
GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Access by
Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean (Resolution adopted at the twelfth plenary session
held on October 31, 1979), AG/Res. 426 (IX-0/79), p. 55 (July 1980), http://ww
w.oas.org/en/sla/docs/ag03793E01.pdf (calling for an equitable solution “for the
purpose of providing Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial connection with
the Pacific Ocean” taking into account the rights and interest of the parties involved as well as the Bolivian proposal that no territorial compensation be included).
327
GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Report on
the Maritime Problem of Bolivia (Resolution adopted at the seventh plenary session, held on November 18, 1983), AG/Res. 686 (XIII-0/83), p. 100 (Dec. 1983),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/docs/ag03797E01.pdf. See also GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Report on the Maritime Problem of
Bolivia (Resolution adopted at the eighth plenary session, held on December 10,
1981), AG/Res. 560 (XI-0/81), p. 95 (June 1982), http://www . . . ..oas.org/en/sla
/docs/ag03795E01.pdf; see GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Report on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia (Resolution adopted at
the sixth plenary session, held on November 27, 1980), AG/Res. 481 (X-0/80), p.
28 (May 1981),http://www.oas.org/en/sla/docs/ag03794E01.pdf.
328
See EL LIBRO DEL MAR, supra note 55, 47-50.
329
See Speech by the President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Mr. Evo
Morales Ayma, UN doc. A/66/PV.13 (Sep. 21, 2011), http://gadebate.un.org/66/
bolivia-plurinational-state (claiming to keep bilateral channels of negotiation
open with Chile); see also H.E. Mr. Evo Morales Ayma, President, GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, (Sept. 26, 2012), http://gadebate.un.org/no
de/396 (addressing Bolivia’s right to Chile’s return of its coastline).
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belonging to Chile,330 a claim repeated in 2012,331 prompting Bolivia to bring the case before the ICJ.332
VI. CONCLUSION
Should the case result in a judgment on the merits, the determination of the substantive law relating to the duty to negotiate presents many challenges for the ICJ and the parties. Outcomes appear
less than satisfying: a finding that a pactum de contrahendo exists,
based on the unilateral or repeated ‘declarations’ of Chilean authorities, would compel the parties to return to diplomacy to find the
specific ‘modalities’ for a solution. Absent a timetable and conditioned only by the difficult-to-measure duty to negotiate in good
faith, a Bolivian victory may result in a Pyrrhic victory. Similarly, a
finding that a pactum de negotiando exists, may only extend the rhetorical torpor that prompted Bolivia to seek third party resolution—
consigning all parties once again to the diplomatic pergatorium that
has afflicted these Andean coastal countries since the War of the
Pacific. A finding that Chile has been negotiating in bad faith institutionally presents the Court with the loathsome prospect of invalidating peace treaties, opening up the prospect of another dispute involving redrawing boundary lines in the region. Were Bolivia to
secure an outcome favorable to its Pacific coastline desires, it would
be left to reconcile the economic equations of its geo-strategic predicament and the attending costs of connecting, operationalizing,
and developing additional infrastructure between the coast and its
330

Declaración del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile Sobre la Entrega de una Nota Por Parte de Bolivia a la Corte Internacional de Justicia,
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE CHILE (July 12, 2011), http://www
.minrel.gob.cl/prontus_minrel/site/artic/20110712/pags/20110712144736.php
(“Bolivia carece de todo fundamento jurídico para reclamar un acceso soberano
al Océano Pacifico por territorios que pertenecen a Chile. Los límites entre Chile
y Bolivia fueron establecidos con precisión hace más de 100 años, en el Tratado
de Paz y Amistad de 1904, el cual es reconocido y respetado por ambos países y
se encuentra plenamente vigente.”).
331
See Chile, H.E. Mr. Alfredo Moreno Charme, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 28, 2012), https://gadebate
.un.org/en/67/chile (categorically rejecting Bolivia’s claim of an outstanding border issue).
332
Obligation to Negotiate Access, Preliminary Objection, supra note 6, ¶ 47,
at 18.
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commercial centers on the Altiplano. A close look at Chile’s less
than clean hands also would probably prompt a judicial reconsideration of Bolivia’s historical record, including its rescission of the
1866 condominium agreement and the double-dealing of the Melgarejo dictatorship, its imposition of the illegal ten cents tax, its refusal to arbitrate as required by the 1874 Boundary Treaty, and its
nineteenth century rejection of efforts to reinstate the condominium
agreement. A finding that neither pactum exists would restate the
status quo and underscore the realities of Chile’s dominion over territory won in a war fought one hundred and thirty-five years ago. It
would blunt the equitable momentum Bolivia has been able to muster within the OAS and elsewhere but also could radicalize regional
relations demarcated already along radical/liberal and indigenous/post-colonial fault lines.333 A judgment favoring Chile would
underscore a primordial feature of territorial temptation: Sentiments
of comity and conscience do not motivate states to cede sovereignty.
Chile negotiated a return of Tacna to Peru but in exchange secured
Arica and its key port, and the fulfilment of its international legal
obligation created by the pactum de contrahendo of the 1883 Treaty
of Ancón. It also secured a jus prohibendi agreement with Peru regarding any future disposition of the territory. Most important, it
secured for Chile a Peruvian sense of satisfaction. Peru long ago
stopped re-fighting the War of the Pacific – and this dividend also
remunerates Chile. That Chile historically has been willing to negotiate and accommodate a Bolivian access to the sea can signify
Chile’s bona fides in attempting a regional accord as much as it can
signify Chile’s elaborate ruse to forestall good faith negotiations.
But it is not clear Bolivian internal politics can accommodate this
interpretation.
The more obvious path to an accord would require all parties
to identify with the dissatisfaction of the existing situation and the
poverty of seeking a resolution of this dispute inside the formal strictures of a third party dispute settlement forum. That formal pathway

333

See generally Steve Ellner, Latin America’s Radical Left in Power: Complexities and Challenges in the Twenty-first Century, 40 LATIN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES 5 (2013); South America’s New Caudillos: Evo Morales of Bolivia
and Democracy, NY TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/
opinion/evo-morales-of-bolivia-and-democracy.html?_r=0.
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to shaping a solution in many ways seems inferior to the social interactions constructed by other, informal or less formal pathways to
international law creation. In this constructivist sense, despite the
perils it may invite, a ruling establishing a pactum de negotiando
could support and enhance notable efforts crafted by the parties, efforts that may reflect a more meaningful pathway simply by not interfering with the parties’ inter-subjective determination of what exactly constitutes a ‘sovereign access to the sea.’
That phrase itself is oblique. As noted by Judge Owada, the
phrase is “not a term of art in general international law,” despite its
usage by both sides in oral and written proceedings.334 One should
not presume that the language of international law is necessarily informing the outcome or the parameters of this case; rather, it would
appear the social and diplomatic interactions of the parties could
possibly affect the legalect of international law.
The legalect of this case, perhaps un-selfconsciously, has been
informed by the parties, notwithstanding the “lengthy and convoluted nature of the Bolivia-Chile-Peru dispute.”335 A litany of creative if forestalled proposals creates modalities for an accord or future
negotiations, including: an 1866 condominium-like arrangement
based on a zone of tripartite occupation as suggested by Peru’s President Morales in 1976; territorial concessions linked to resource exchanges, such as Bolivian liquefied natural gas production to supplement Chile’s and Peru’s energy needs in exchange for territorial
concessions linked to a maritime zone or riparian issue; territorial
swaps as proposed by Chile during the Charaña discussions, then by
Peru; special territorial corridors or shared sovereignty over ports as
contemplated by Coolidge in the Tacna-Arica Arbitration; development of a Free City zone as contemplated by the 1866 condominium
arrangement and U.S. Secretary of State Kellogg; expansion of
agreements to facilitate transportation networks modeled on Chile’s
construction of the Arica-La Paz railroad or infrastructure needs
around the port of Ilo; or the ‘creation of a special transportation

334

May 8 Public Sitting, supra note 50, at 38.
THE CARTER CTR., APPROACHES TO SOLVING TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS:
SOURCES, SITUATIONS, SCENARIOS, AND SUGGESTIONS 39 (2010) [hereinafter
CARTER CENTER].
335
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corridor of a nonterritorial nature’, 336 perhaps to accommodate Bolivia’s and Chile’s undertapped world-wide comparative advantage
in the production of lithium. 337
These are the modalities the parties need to reconfigure, but
within a trilateral rather than bilateral context. Clearly, a return to
the 13-point agenda discussions would be of benefit, but with Peru’s
inclusion, as well. Tri-national discussions are not only implied by
the jus prohibendi provision agreed to by Chile and Peru, but would
signify a fully integrated resolution strategy that could create intersubjective avenues for sub-regional economic, political, and legal
development. The basis for the 13-point agenda already has been
broached officially and unofficially by a group of diplomats, journalists, and scholars, who in 2001 launched the Proyecto Trinacional to remove conceptual and practical obstacles by advancing
academic, cultural, and commercial ties.338
Trilateral discussions also would promote the possibility of this
sub-regional growth triangle in ways only indirectly attempted.
Sub-regional growth triangles have been well studied in a South East
Asian context,339 as well as specifically within South American and
West African comparative perspectives.340 The unencumbered
movement of labor, technology, and capital in these regions have
been known to create significant political, social, and economic consequences.341 Factors associated with successful examples seem
possible within the Andean context: economic complementarity, ge-

336

Id.
See Hodson supra note 39.
338
See Ronald Bruce St. John, Same Space, Different Dreams: Bolivia’s Quest
for a Pacific Port, 1 THE BOLIVIAN RESEARCH REVIEW (2001), available at
http://www.bolivianstudies.org/revista/2001_07.htm; See also CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS ESTRARÉGICOS PARA LA INTEGRACIÓN LATIONAMERICA ET AL., HACIA UN
EFNOQUE TRINACIONAL DE LAS RELACIONES ENTRE BOLIVIA, CHILE Y PERÚ 8
(2001).
339
See David Wadley & Hayu Parasati, Inside South East Asia’s Growth Triangles, 85 GEOGRAPHY 323,323–34 (2000).
340
See generally ARIE M. KACOWICZ, ZONES OF PEACE IN THE THIRD WORLD:
SOUTH AMERICA AND WEST AFRICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).
341
See generally Brian Bridges, Beyond Economics: Growth Triangles in
Southeast Asia, 21 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 55 (1997).
337
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ographic proximity, government commitment and policy coordination, infrastructure development, and private sector market forces.342
South America’s context, turbulence notwithstanding, presents relative macro-conditions not present elsewhere: Since the War of the
Pacific, it has not been the situs of major international war; it has
been less impeded by ethnic or religious cleavages; although internally weak in terms of political structures, South American states
escaped the quasi-status of less fully-fledged nation states; and peoples of the region have been better able to democratize while developing regional, cultural, normative, and transnational identities.343
The establishment of a ‘nascent pluralistic security community’ in
the Southern Cone generates guarded optimism about transforming
national identities and historical zones of conflict into “incipient
zones of negative peace”344 – which are conceived as “the absence
of systemic, large-scale collective violence between political communities.”345 It may also have an effect on the regional construction
of sovereignty. Taken for granted as an inflexible norm, ‘it is easy
to overlook the extent to which sovereignty norms reflect an ongoing artifact of practice’ – not a once-and-for-all creation of norms
established by the War of the Pacific.346 The most dynamic aspect
of this problem is that the three parties could reconfigure sovereignty away from the limiting and seemingly intractable options presented by its Westphalian construction. Perhaps sovereignty in the
Northern Atacama Desert is a jus dispositivum awaiting a sensible
reconstruction by the parties most affected by the War of the Pacific.
A complicated history involving borders imposed by the fiat
power of uti possidetis was meant to protect against post-colonial
land grabs throughout South America. But indeterminate territorial
demarcations in the Atacama following the collapse of the Spanish
Empire prompted competing claims of possession, occupation, and
development,347 but not immediately. Territorial temptations ex342
Wadley & Parasati, supra note 339, at 324; see generally Bridges, supra
note, 341.
343
See KACOWICZ, supra note 340, at 178–80.
344
Id. at 177.
345
Id. at 7.
346
See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 413 (1992).
347
See ST. JOHN BOUNDARIES, TRADE, AND SEAPORTS, supra note 12, at 29.
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posed the weakness of uti possidetis for Bolivia, Chile, and Peru because of mid-nineteenth century disputes over resources. Competing historical narratives, national interests, forestalled plebiscites,
massive migration, secret and broken promises, and clean and dirty
hand complicate the question of a sovereign access for Bolivia to the
sea. The question involves, certainly for Bolivia and Chile, and of
late Peru, national identity and honor. Chile and Peru litigated before the ICJ a maritime boundary dispute directly stemming from
the 1929 Treaty of Lima, resulting in a 2014 ICJ judgment.348 The
settlement of that maritime claim, itself problematic because it
leaves no maritime space for Bolivia to ‘own’ should it achieve a
sovereign access to the sea, almost immediately has propelled Chile
and Peru into a dispute over a nine acre (37,610 sq. meter) triangle
(the La Yarada-Los Palos district of Tacna) landward of the point
(Punto Concordia) used by the ICJ for its seaward delimitation.349
The dispute has involved diplomatic exchanges and allegations of
troop deployments,350 the recall of both ambassadors,351 and tensions fueled by other charges of espionage.352
The principle of pacta tertiis, itself a reflection of the sovereign
equality of states, ensures that judicial settlements will not affect the
interests of non-parties.353 But as the recent maritime delimitation
case between Peru and Chile suggests, it does not necessarily preclude the ICJ from ruling on a case before it as between Chile and
Bolivia.
The question is whether the ICJ can impute more meaning to ‘a
sovereign access to the sea’ than would be suggested by finding, at
best, that a pactum de negotiandum exits based on the historical record and factual effectivités. The essential indeterminacy of the historical record suggests ‘something more’ clear and convincing is
needed other than the disputable inferences and references proffered
348

See Maritime Dispute, supra note 257, at 3.
See Boundary Tensions Between Peru and Chile Continue, supra note 258.
350
Chile and Peru in Border Spat Over La Yarada-Los Palos Area, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34759018.
351
See Colin Post, Border Rhetoric Heats Up Between Chile and Peru, PERU
REPORTS (Nov. 7, 2015), http://perureports.com/2015/11/07/border-rhetoric-heat
s-up-between-chile-and-peru/.
352
See Boundary Tensions Between Peru and Chile Continue, supra note 258.
353
See MICHAIL VAGIAS, THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 187 (2014).
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by Bolivia. Given that indeterminacy, it is doubtful the ICJ will
provide finality to this ongoing saga, and that does not appear to be
its charge. Absent a deus ex machina, the opportunity costs to settlement increase for this sub-regional growth triangle, reinvigorating the prospect that the three principal parties, not the ICJ, already
have constructed an array of intersubjective modalities that can lead
to settlement, and indeed potential cooperation, informing along the
way the rich and informal texture of international law creation.

